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The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven 
Activism: Avoiding Governance Pitfalls 
 
Joel Slawotsky* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States shareholder-value-centric corporate governance 
architecture obligates corporate management to harness the business to 
maximize financial returns to the owners — the shareholders — even at the 
expense of other non-shareholder interests.1  In contrast to the United 
States model, the interests of shareholders are not the exclusive driver of 
managerial conduct in stakeholder governance systems.  Under the 
stakeholder model, a variety of other interests are considered such as 
employees, suppliers, environmental, social and other interests.2  The 
stakeholder regime is prevalent in both the European Union3 and Asia.4 
Several nations such as the U.K. and Australia — historically shareholder-
value jurisdictions — have apparently embraced an “enlightened 
 
*   Former law clerk to the Hon. Charles H. Tenney (U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y.) and AV peer-review 
rated attorney at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal (now Dentons).  He has taught at Radzyner Law 
School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel and other law and business schools. 
jslawotsky@idc.ac.il.  
 1. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available for shareholders).    
 2. See YADONG LUO, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 37 (2007) (noting the 
stakeholder model emphasizes various non-shareholder interests depending upon the particular cultural 
norms of that nation).  For example, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund takes social responsibility 
into account when making activist investment decisions such as divestment.  See also ROGER 
BLANPAIN ET AL., RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM SHAREHOLDER VALUE TO 
STAKEHOLDER VALUE 121 (2011) (Norway has a stakeholder model of governance as opposed to a 
shareholder model).  
 3. See LUO, supra note 2, at 41–48 (describing continental European nations as being primarily 
stakeholder value driven); see also Franklin Allen et al., Stakeholder Governance, Competition and 
Firm Value 1, (CESifo Group, Working Paper No. 4652, 2014) (“Germany is by no means the only 
country where the interests of parties other than just shareholders have bearing on companies’ policies. 
Employees are represented — directly or indirectly — in companies’ boards in several other countries 
such as Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and France.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 4. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 1–2 (“Similar arrangements are present in China, where firms are 
explicitly required to bear in mind their social responsibilities in conducting their business operations.  
In Japan social norms have similar effects in that it is widely accepted that stakeholder interests, and in 
particular employee interests, play a predominant role.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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shareholder value” model5 which seeks to promote other stakeholder 
values, mitigating the otherwise exclusive focus on profits and shareholder 
returns.6  Some political7 and business8 leaders have advocated a similar 
model for the United States, referring to it as “sustainable capitalism.”9 
In the United States, the supreme importance of shareholder value has 
fostered a cultural encouragement of activism which has been in practice 
since at least the 1930s.10  The activist strategy gained traction in the late 
1970s11 and rose to prominence in the 1980s, as financial legends such as 
Carl Icahn12 and T. Boone Pickens engaged in various corporate take-over 
 
 5. See Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose in a 
Post-Financial World?, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 50–97 (Joan Loughrey ed., 2013); see also Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Corporate 
Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the U.K. and the U.S., in CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 147 (Praveen Kumar & Allessandro Zattoni eds., 2006). 
 6. See Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened 
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take? 17(11) INT’L CO. AND COM. L. 
REV. 329, 339 (2006). 
 7. See Joel Slawotsky, Sustainable Capitalism: Revelations from the Japanese Model, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. VOIR DIRE 10 (2012) (“Critics of America’s shareholder-centric model allege that it is 
archaic and a failure, and they believe that the American version of capitalism must undergo a dramatic 
shift toward a stakeholder-based model emulating other nations . . . .  President Obama recently echoed 
the ‘sustainable capitalism’ theme by calling for major changes that would enhance the interests of 
other stakeholders in order to construct an economy ‘built to last.’”). 
 8. See James Surowiecki, A Fair Day's Wage, NEW YORKER (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.newyork 
er.com/magazine/2015/02/09/fair-days-wage (noting CEO Mark Bertolini’s comments on Aetna’s 
substantial pay raise for its lowest-paid workers: “Companies are not just money-making machines. For 
the good of the social order, these are the kinds of investments we [corporations] should be willing to 
make.”). 
9.  Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 10; see also Al Gore & David Blood, A Manifesto for Sustainable 
Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at A21 (“Before the crisis and since, we and others have called 
for a more responsible form of capitalism, what we call sustainable capitalism: a framework that seeks 
to maximize long-term economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while integrating 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics throughout the decision-making process.”); 
Margaret Talev et al., Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders Clash Over  Reining In Wall Street, BLOOMBERG 
POLITICS (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-10-13/debate-in-
vegas-will-hillary-clinton-give-her-competitors-an-opening (Clinton’s comments about “reigning in 
capitalism”).  However, shareholder value focused corporate governance has served the United States 
well and should not be changed.  Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 11 (pointing out that U.S. economic 
performance is dramatically superior to the stakeholder value model of Japan and noting that the 
stakeholder system also has corporate scandals).   
 10. See John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Offensive Shareholder Activism in U.S. Public 
Companies, 1900–49 (U. of Cambridge Fac. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 09/2011, 
2011) (“Our findings indicate that offensive shareholder activism, while not commonplace, did occur 
and was considerably more prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s than in earlier decades.”).   
 11. Id. at 1 (“Carl Icahn, 1980s corporate raider and currently operator of Trian Partners, a major 
activist hedge fund, spelled out his business philosophy in a late 1970s memo to prospective investors 
in Icahn’s initial investment partnership: ‘It is our contention that sizeable profits can be earned by 
taking large positions in “undervalued” stocks then attempting to control the destinies of the companies 
in question by: a) trying to convince management to liquidate or sell the company to a “white knight”; 
b) waging a proxy contest; c) making a tender offer and/or; selling back our position to the 
company.’”). 
 12. Carl Icahn remains active.   See Ben McLannahan, AIG Cuts Costs to Deflect Ichan Pressure, 
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battles.13 Numerous corporate takeover disputes with large corporations14 
spawned major litigation and substantially impacted American corporate 
law.15 
Shareholder activism is no longer the domain of individual rogue 
entrepreneurs and “cowboy-capitalists,”16 but rather an increasingly 
popular strategy employed since the 1990s in the United States that is 
substantially influencing a variety of large corporations.17  In recent years, 
activism’s growth has been striking.18  “Since 2006, almost one in every six 
corporations in the Standard and Poor’s 1500 index has been the target of  
activist campaigns.”19  Activism has become increasingly acceptable20 and 
 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b7981ae-81b7-11e5-a01c-
8650859a4767.html#axzz3qQaj2rdG (“Last week the New York-based insurer came under attack from 
Carl Icahn, the activist investor, who accused management of dawdling over cost cuts and delivering 
consistently subpar returns.   Mr. Icahn, who has pressed for changes at companies from Apple to Hertz, 
argued that AIG should immediately split into three since it was ‘too big to succeed’ in its current form, 
which subjects it to heavy supervision from regulators and constraints on returning capital to 
shareholders.”). 
 13. Barbara Kiviat, 10 Questions for Carl Icahn, TIME (Feb. 15, 2007), http://content. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590446,00.html (“It has been a busy few weeks for Carl Icahn, 
the billionaire financier who gained fame   some would say notoriety  in the 1980s by taking over 
Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) and agitating for change at the likes of Texaco and RJR Nabisco.”). 
 14. Corporate raiders such as Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, and T. Boone Pickens gained notoriety 
during their heyday in the 1980s by acquiring controlling stakes in undervalued companies, and by 
aggressively using a combination of power and debt finance to force companies to break up and to 
replace boards of directors.  See David Benoit, Activism’s Long Road from Corporate Raiding to 
Banner Year, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activisms-long-road 
-from-corporate-raiding-to-banner-year-1451070910. 
 15. Numerous seminal judicial decisions were ultimately delivered as a result of litigation 
undertaken by activist shareholders or defensive measures undertaken by corporate boards to block 
activists.  See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (upholding 
directors’ defensive measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill agreement to 
thwart activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding directors’ authorization of a large share buyback funded by 
new debt to thwart activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer); Revlon, Inc., 506 
A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available for shareholders). 
16. See Benoit, supra note 14 (“The industry has come a long way since the 1980s, when Carl 
Icahn, Saul Steinberg, T. Boone Pickens and other mavericks would amass large stakes in companies 
and demand a sale of the entire company.  They were called ‘corporate raiders’ and ‘greenmailers’ and 
were widely criticized.  These days activists, while not exactly welcomed in corporate boardrooms, are 
rarely treated as ill-mannered outsiders.”). 
 17. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 
1994), https://hbr.org/1994/01/institutional-investors-the-reluctant-activists (noting the nascent rise if 
institutional activism in the 1990s). 
 18. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes (noting 
the “unprecedented” extent of activism). 
 19. Sharon Hannes, Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors, 16.1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 245, 258–59 (2015). 
 20. Benoit, supra note 14 (“Activists were a different breed back in the late 1970s and 1980s.  
They made ‘midnight raids’ on stocks, building large, often controlling, stakes.  Then they pushed 
companies to sell themselves to the highest bidder or to the raider himself, or to buy back their positions 
at above-market prices, a practice known as greenmail.”). 
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has “hardened into the default boardroom agenda.”21 
A diverse array of American businesses are being affected by 
activists.22  Major brand name, blue-chip companies have been the frequent 
targets of activists choreographing board coups and successfully pushing 
for corporate break-ups.   
 
Since 2011, activists have helped depose the CEOs of 
Procter & Gamble and Microsoft and have fought for the 
breakup of Motorola, eBay and Yahoo.  On January 27th, 
[2016], Yahoo said it would spin off its stake in Alibaba, a 
Chinese internet firm, after pressure from the activist 
Starboard Value.  Activists have won board seats at PepsiCo, 
orchestrated a huge round of consolidation across the 
pharmaceutical industry, and taken on Dow Chemicals and 
DuPont.23 
 
As the tactic has become mainstream, a rising chorus of critics have 
urged a crackdown on activism. This is hardly surprising as activism 
intersects with the current corporate governance debate over “shareholder 
value” versus “sustainable capitalism”24 and touches upon the fiduciary 
duties of directors to monitor and correct poor management.  Delaware 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine argues that shareholder activism 
must be more stringently regulated by tightening the time frame for 
disclosing a holding of five percent of a company’s shares.25 Several U.S. 
 
 21. Dennis K. Berman, Activists Wept for There Were No More Worlds to Conquer, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 23, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023040499045795177436014 
84598. 
 22. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Americans encounter firms that activists have 
targeted when they brush their teeth (Procter & Gamble), answer their phone (Apple), log in to their 
computer (Microsoft, Yahoo and eBay), dine out (Burger King and PepsiCo) and watch television 
(Netflix).  In December an activist fund called Trian broke new ground by winning a board seat at Bank 
of New York Mellon, custodian for many of the world’s biggest banks.”). 
23.  See An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/ 
21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-they-will-change-ame 
rican. 
 24. See Renée B. Adams et al., Board Members’ Values and the Shareholder-Stakeholder 
Dilemma 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst.  Fin. Res. Paper Series No.204/2008, 2008) (“Few 
issues in the fields of strategy and corporate governance remain as contested as the topic of 
shareholders and stakeholders has been for so long.”); see also Slawotsky, supra note 7 (noting the 
recent calls for transforming the United States shareholder value governance regime to one that places 
stakeholders’ interest higher up); see also Benoit, supra note 14  (“The debate about whether activism is 
good for U.S. companies over the long term hasn’t gone away, most recently popping up in the 
presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton.  She has decried ‘hit-and-run’ activists, while also saying 
some activists help hold managers accountable.”). 
 25. Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has called for amending the ten-day 
disclosure filing requirement of five-percent holders to one day.  See Michael J. de la Merced, infra 
note 81; see also Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global Collaboration and 
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Senators have recently introduced legislation to tighten the reporting 
obligation from ten days to two days.26 Others have noted that the 
employment of financially engineered products such as derivatives can be 
used to avoid detection, constituting an abusive tactic, and should therefore 
be treated as owned shares.27 Some critics opine that hedge funds should be 
prosecuted for some of their activities.28  Politicians, corporations, business 
interests and scholars have joined the criticism of shareholder activism.29 
In response, proponents of activism and smaller shareholders argue 
that in a corporate governance model devoid of activism, managerial 
misconduct and/or incompetence will often drive the operation of the 
company to the detriment of the business and the shareholders. Without 
activists overseeing the company, advancement of self-interest, operational 
mismanagement, director failure to monitor, poor corporate governance 
and other damage to the company and its shareholders would remain 
unaddressed.30  Supporters also note that activists will gravitate towards 
 
Financial Innovation, 35 REV. BANKING FIN. L. 272 (forthcoming 2016) (providing a detailed 
discussion of whether 13(d) should be amended). 
26.  Claire Groden, These Senators Want to Reign in Activist Investors, FORTUNE (Mar. 18, 2016, 
3:04 PM),  http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/democrats-shareholder-activism/ (proposed bill to reduce the 
five-percent disclosure obligation from ten to two days).  See also Letter from Wachtell et al., Partners 
at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 7, 2011, 8:46 PM), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (arguing that the time period should be reduced 
to one day).   
 27. The U.S. securities laws mandate disclosure of an individual’s five-percent holding, but if a 
group exists, each several holding is aggregated.  Under the securities laws, if several members of a 
group jointly own five percent of the shares a disclosure is required.  Concerns have been expressed 
with respect to funds who have formed an alliance but endeavor to avoid the trappings of group 
formation thus evading the disclosure requirement.  See Matt Levine, The SEC Doesn't Like It When 
Hedge Funds Talk to Each Other, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 5, 2015, 4:12 PM), http:// www. 
bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-05/the-sec-doesn-t-like-it-when-hedge-funds-talk-to-each-other. 
 28. See Steve Denning, The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 
4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-activist-
hedge-funds/#65ade6c04447. 
29.   See, e.g., Groden, supra note 26 (“We cannot allow our economy to be hijacked by a small 
group of investors who seek only to enrich themselves at the expense of workers, taxpayers and 
communities,” Sen. Baldwin said in a statement.  “These reforms will help ensure that no other small 
towns in America will fall victim to activist hedge funds on Wall Street.”); Alexis Leondis & Miles 
Weiss, U.S. Chamber Forms Coaltion to Fend Off Activist Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 
2, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-02/u-s-chamber-forms-coalition 
-to-fend-off-activist-hedge-funds (“Corporations are turning to the nation’s biggest business lobby to 
help fend off activist investors such as Dan Loeb and Bill Ackman.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is 
forming a coalition to make sure ‘long-term value creation’ drives public companies’ decisions, 
according to a letter it sent Thursday to Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White.  
The group plans to weigh in on regulations that affect corporate governance, the letter said.”). 
 30. Katherine Rushton, Carl Icahn Attacks Companies That Protect ‘Unfit’ Chief Executives, 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/11029776/Carl-Icahn-
attacks-companies-that-protect-unfit-chief-executives.html (quoting Carl Icahn: “Too many companies 
in this country are terribly run and there’s no system in place to hold the chief executives and boards of 
these inadequately managed companies accountable . . . .  Our current system of corporate governance 
protects mediocre chief executives and boards that are mismanaging companies and this must be 
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badly managed companies and that, without such activists, smaller 
shareholders are powerless to remedy a poor management situation.31  
Defenders of activism note that activists improve the operation of a 
business. For example, activist hedge fund Starboard Value acquired 
control of Darden and pressured the directors to improve the business and 
company operating performance by actually working in the restaurants.   
 
After Starboard Value took over the board of Darden 
Restaurants Inc., the hedge fund wanted its newly minted 
directors to have a feel for the business.  So it put them to 
work.  Every board member worked a night in a restaurant, 
said Starboard Chief Executive Officer Jeff Smith, who also 
is Darden’s chairman.  Smith said he waited on tables and 
served food in the kitchen.32 
 
Clearly, there is a good type of activism. Lacking a major activist 
investor, lackluster managerial performance will likely remain.   
Do the benefits of shareholder activism outweigh the risks? 
Examining the issue in the context of corporate governance offers an 
excellent vehicle to determine whether activism is virtuous or deleterious.  
Activist detractors point out that short-termism, mass layoffs, terminated 
CEOs, and financially induced mergers are harmful to “stakeholders” such 
as the community, employees, or society.  However, under the shareholder-
value centric model, if the share price rises and dividends distributed, the 
shareholders are enriched.  Pursuant to the shareholder-value model, 
operating the company towards the goal of shareholder profit is proper and 
activism is in sync with shareholder value.  Therefore, pursuant to the 
shareholder-value model, activism should be encouraged as long as 
shareholders benefit, even if such gains are at the expense of other 
stakeholders. 
In contrast, a governance regime encompassing stakeholder value may 
not encourage activism if other stakeholders of a corporation are 
disadvantaged by activists.  Under the stakeholder model, directors and 
officers must also, to varying degrees, consider the interests of employees, 
creditors, the environmental impact, and the community when making 
 
changed.”). 
 31. See, e.g., April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds 
and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 222–25 (arguing that activist conduct supports better 
governance). 
 32. Craig Giammona, Olive Garden’s Hedge Fund Bosses Waited Tables to Aid Turnaround, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 1, 2015, 7:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/ 
olive-garden-s-hedge-fund-bosses-waited-tables-to-aid-turnaround. 
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business decisions.  Some governance systems, such as Japan’s, may in fact 
deter shareholder activism through a governance architecture which 
prevents accumulation of adequate number of shares, and a business culture 
wherein loyalty and fidelity among insider-shareholder and management 
trumps outside shareholder interests.33 
Activism encourages superior corporate governance and productive 
use of company resources.  Shareholder activists have the power and assets 
to correct and improve company performance.  The Singapore Stock 
Exchange CEO noted that activism encourages superior governance and 
has called on large investors to become activists.  In fact “[t]he Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) has called for greater shareholder activism from 
institutional investors in Singapore.  It said this is because institutional 
investors have the clout and resources to improve governance in the 
companies they invest in.”34  
As will be discussed below, Japan’s economy has lost two decades.  
The difficulty of engaging in activism may in fact be a contributing cause 
of Japan’s economic problems because poorly managed Japanese 
corporations were allowed to escape the consequences of bad management.  
The lack of vigorous activism may have perpetuated the under-performance 
of Japan’s economy.  Thus, shareholder activism should be encouraged as a 
virtuous tool of superior corporate governance.  This Article opines that 
encouraging shareholder activism and therefore shareholder value, 
comports with superior governance and economic performance, and thus 
concludes that shareholder activism should not be discouraged or unduly 
restrained.  This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II discusses the historical 
context and current controversy over activism in the United States.  Part III 
reviews the arguments set forth by detractors and supporters of activism. 
Part IV examines the major corporate governance models employed.  Part 
V analyzes whether activism is virtuous, noting the link between a 
jurisdiction that ranks low on corporate governance/economic performance 
and a lack of activism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33. The Keiretsu groups, wherein allied loyal companies own shares in each other and place 
loyalty and allegiance above the interests of the outside shareholders, is a manifestation of this 
governance architecture.  The business culture also fosters a disdain for the outside shareholders. 
 34. See Linette Lim, More Shareholder Activism from Institutional Investors: SGX, CHANNEL 
NEWSASIA (Nov. 24, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/singapore/more 
-shareholder-activism/2289042.html (emphasis added). 
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II. ACTIVIST INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
“Corporate America and activist investors have had a war; the 
activists have won.”35 Activist investing in the United States, once the 
primary domain of financial entrepreneurs and renegade traders, is now a 
mainstream strategic investment tactic wielded by government pensions, 
private institutions, hedge and other large funds.36  Activists have enjoyed 
substantial success37 and the time required prior to obtaining profitable 
results is shrinking, thus further incentivizing activism.38 
Shareholder activists present a wide array of demands.  Examples 
include:    
 
Activist . . . campaigns against public company targets by 
taking large stock positions and then publicly agitating for 
changes, such as stock repurchases, extraordinary dividends, 
dispositions of non-core businesses or an outright sale of the 
company.  There is often an implicit or explicit threat of a 
proxy contest to remove some or all of the target board 
members and management if their demands are not met.  
Ultimately, the activist may receive one or more seats on the 
target company board, either through a settlement with the 
target or success at a stockholder meeting.39 
 
 
 
 
 35. See Carl Icahn: The Blogger, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2013), http://app.ft.com/cms/s/67fa6b88-
3d91-11e3-9928-00144feab7de.html. 
36.  See, e.g., Randall Smith, Some Big Public Pension Funds Are Behaving Like Activist Investors, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/some-big-public-pension-funds-
are-behaving-like-activist-investors/ (noting the growing activism practiced by established and 
“flagship” institutions).  Sovereign wealth funds are also investing in hedge funds.  See also Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Investors in Hedge Funds, PREQIN (June 2015), https://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/ 
hf/Preqin-HFSL-June-15-Sovereign-Wealth-Fund-Investors-in-Hedge.pdf (noting the increasing 
practice of sovereign wealth fund investments in hedge funds).   
37.  Paula Schaap, Dow, DuPont, Yahoo  Activist Shareholders Hit a Trifecta, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS (Dec 9, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/dow-dupont-
yahoo-activist-shareholders-hit-a-trifecta (“What’s more, activists were successful about 74 percent of 
the time last year in getting companies to make at least some of the changes they requested, according 
to the report, compiled for an October conference hosted by Schulte Roth & Zabel, a law firm that often 
works for activists.”). 
 38.  Id. (“Activists have had a strong year generally in getting their way.  Companies have settled 
within 56 days on average after an activist demands board representation, compared with 67 days last 
year and 74 days in 2013, data from Activist Insight show.”). 
 39. Mark D. Gerstein, Hushmail: Are Activist Hedge Funds Breaking Bad?, HARV. L. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/07/07/hushmail-are-
activist-hedge-funds-breaking-bad/#more-64293. 
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Activist investing is a popular tactic40 and activist investors have a 
variety of available strategies.  At times, activists take stakes with the intent 
(or hope) of forcing a “white knight” to save the company by entering the 
fray and making a generous offer.41  Sometimes, activists take stakes in 
order to break up the company because they believe the company’s parts 
are worth more than the whole.42  The “greenmail” strategy — the buying 
of shares often accompanied by litigation or threats of the same — is 
designed to force the management to buy the shares back from the investor 
at a premium.43  “Hushmail” is the practice of the activists withdrawing 
their corporate governance concerns in return for the company buying their 
shares.44  At times, activists attempt to influence a corporation to issue 
dividends.45 
Activist investing in American equity markets is not new,46 but surged 
to prominence in the 1980s.47  The activist investor of the 1980s in the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Abram Brown, Icahn Wants a Seat for Himself on Dell’s Board; Activists Unveil 
Proposed Directors, FORBES (May 14, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013 
/05/14/icahn-wants-a-seat-for-himself-on-dells-board-activists-unveil-proposed-directors/#73013f186 
a18; Ian Sherr & David Benoit, Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:02 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579010971386703480. 
 41. Bryan Rich, Watsa’s Blackberry Bid May Not Be the Last One, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:03 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/09/24/billionaire-watsas-blackberry-bid-may 
-not-be-the-last-one/#119a2a9316ca. 
 42. Mark Scott, Activist Investor Seeks Breakup of UBS, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013, 7:18 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/activist-investor-seeks-breakup-of-ubs/. 
43.  See Michael Parrish, Occidental Ends Lawsuits Over Cost of Buyout: Settlement: Oxy Will Pay 
$3.65 Million to Shareholders Who Objected to the Price David Murdock Got for His Shares in 1984, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-21/business/fi-4044_1_david-murdock.  
The practice of greenmail has been reduced due to regulations imposed to discourage it, but the line 
between greenmail and hushmail is often not clear.  See Stephen Bainbridge, The Return of Greenmail: 
Private Rent-Seeking by Activist Shareholders, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/06/the-return-of-greenmail-private-
rent-seeking-by-activist-shareholders.html (“More companies are resorting to an old tactic to get rid of 
activist investors: Pay them to go away.  The practice, which involves buying back shares from activist 
hedge funds, has raised concerns among some investors because it bears similarities to “greenmail,” a 
controversial strategy popular in the 1980s . . . .  The practice differs from greenmail in two crucial 
aspects.  The share buybacks aren't at a premium to the market but typically at or slightly below the last 
trading price.  They also don't follow threats of hostile takeovers.”).  
 44. See Gerstein, supra note 39 (describing the phenomenon of “hush money” being paid to 
activist investors who no longer want to own the company’s shares and sell the shares back to the 
company at a slight premium or discount to avoid dumping the shares and incurring losses.  Following 
the transaction “the activist may enter into a standstill and non-disparagement agreement with the 
target.”). 
 45. Elisabeth Behrmann & Yuriy Humber, Transocean Reaches $1.1 Billion Dividend Accord with 
Icahn, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2013-11-11/transocean-reaches-accord-with-icahn-on-dividend-plan-and-board. 
46.  See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism 
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75–82 (2011) (highlighting the rise of hedge fund shareholder 
activism over the last thirty years).  
 47. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1274–81 (2008) (discussing the historical transition of influence on corporate activities from 
a company’s management to its shareholders, particularly through the advent of activist hedge funds). 
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American markets was likely a sole investor or a financial entrepreneur48 
whose stated goal was to shake up a corporation and unlock shareholder 
value.49  In fact,  
 
[p]rivate financiers were the archetype activist investors in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and large institutions did not generally 
participate in activist investing (although the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) did commence 
using socially responsible investing benchmarks in the 1970s 
and 1980s).50 
 
Activist investing has enjoyed a robust resurgence in recent years51 
and has become a respected and accepted investment strategy.52  
Significantly, while once considered “aggressive,”53 the tactic has become 
respectable with “mainstream” institutional funds and hedge funds together 
wielding immense financial firepower.54  “Funds managed by activists 
 
 48. See An Investor Calls, supra note 23 (“The old guard includes Carl Icahn, an outrageous and 
outrageously successful septuagenarian, who has been on the warpath since the 1980s.  Nelson Peltz has 
similarly deep roots, but rather more gravitas.  Over the years he has attacked Cadbury, Pepsi and 
Kraft.”). 
 49.  See An Investor Calls, supra note 23 (“In the 1980s activists were called corporate raiders and 
were the jackals of capitalism, outcasts that attacked and dismembered weak companies to widespread 
opprobrium but consoling profit.  They were immortalised in the film Wall Street, whose charismatic 
criminal, Gordon Gekko, showed his mettle by treating greed as good and lunch as for wimps.  They 
faded from prominence after a series of scandals and the collapse of the junk-bond market in the late 
1980s.”). 
50.  See ESG Report, Towards Sustainable Investment: Taking Responsibility (2012), https://www. 
calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/esg-report-2012.pdf (describing CalPERS’ efforts at sustainable 
investing including climate change, environmental and labor); see generally Why TIAA–CREF?, TIAA, 
https://www.tiaa.org/public/sri-funds-why-tiaa-cref-for-responsible-investing (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) 
(providing a timeline of TIAA-CREF’s history of responsible investing).  
 51. See also Benoit, supra note 14 (“Several factors contributed to this shift, according to 
corporate executives, activists, bankers and lawyers.  The financial crisis fanned dissatisfaction with 
corporate executives and brought low interest rates that helped activists thrive.  Activists got more 
sophisticated about analyzing target companies and built alliances with other big shareholders, 
including mutual funds.  And broad shifts in corporate governance gave more power to all shareholders, 
including activists.”). 
 52. David Bogoslaw, Icahn’s New Megaphone for Shareholder Activism, CORP. SECRETARY (Oct. 
25, 2013), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/proxy-voting-shareholder-actions/12567/icahns-
new-megaphone-shareholder-activism/ (describing the increasing popularity of shareholder activism). 
 53. Benoit, supra note 14 (“After decades of being treated as boorish gate-crashers, activist 
investors are infiltrating the boardrooms of large companies like never before.”). 
 54. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Another is that today’s activists belie the 
scavenging stereotype of the 1980s. They often seek to improve firms’ boards rather than strip 
companies of assets.  They work with other shareholders, frequently winning the support of big money-
managers such as Capital Group and Fidelity.  They are raising longer-term capital and so stretching 
their investment horizons.  ValueAct, based in San Francisco, locks in its investors for three to four 
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climbed to $129.7 billion as of mid-2015, almost doubling from the $65.5 
billion they had to play with in 2012, data from HFR show.”55  It has been 
noted that: 
 
Activist investors like Carl C. Icahn, Daniel S. Loeb and 
William A. Ackman are getting deep pocketed imitators.  
Some of the biggest public pension funds, which have 
sought to influence companies for years, are now starting to 
emulate these investors by engaging with, and sometimes 
seeking to oust, directors of companies whose stock they 
own.56 
 
Moreover, this mainstream institutional activism has shifted from the 
socially responsible context of CalPERS and TIAA-CREF to a more profit-
centric model.   
 
The new activists have dramatically upped the pressure on 
corporate executives and boards.  Nearly every business day 
they target another company . . .  Their game is simple: They 
buy stocks they view as undervalued and pressure 
management to do things they believe will raise the value, 
such as giving more cash back to shareholders or shedding 
divisions that they think are driving down the stock price. 
With increasing frequency they get deeply involved in 
governance — demanding board seats, replacing CEOs, and 
advocating specific business strategies.57 
 
Part of the explosive growth in activism is due to the substantial 
success of, and the immense profits available from, activism.58  “Activist 
hedge funds have outperformed their non-activist peers and market indices, 
generating a 19.4% compound annual growth rate since 2009, as compared 
to 7.5% for all hedge funds and 12.3% for S&P 500 companies.”59  Marcel 
Kahan and Edward Rock argue: 
 
 
years and has served on the boards of 37 firms, including Microsoft.  Mr Ackman has raised a pile of 
‘permanent capital.’”). 
 55. Schaap, supra note 37. 
 56. Smith, supra note 36. 
 57. Bill George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 
2014), http://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors/ar/1. 
 58. Klein & Zur, supra note 31 (estimating that approximately seventy percent of the time activists 
were successful in obtaining a board seat). 
 59. Hannes, supra note 19, at 259. 
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It is uncontested that activism has played a crucial role in 
shaping corporate governance.  Recently, hedge funds have 
pressured McDonald’s to spin off major assets in an IPO; 
asked Time Warner to change its business strategy; 
threatened or commenced proxy contests at H.J. Heinz, 
Massey Energy, KT&G, info USA, Sitel, and GenCorp; 
made a bid to acquire Houston Exploration; pushed for a 
merger between Euronext and Deutsche Börse; pushed for 
“changes in management and strategy” at Nabi 
Biopharmaceuticals; opposed acquisitions by Novartis of the 
remaining 58% stake in Chiron, by Sears Holdings of the 
46% minority interest in Sears Canada, by Micron of Lexar 
Media, and by a group of private equity firms of VNU; 
threatened litigation against Delphi; and pushed for litigation 
against Calpine that led to the ouster of its top two 
executives.60 
 
Since activists often target the large influential corporations, activists 
have significant power.   
 
In the space of twenty-four hours, DuPont Co. and Dow 
Chemical Co. — two symbols of U.S. industrial might — 
and Yahoo! Inc. — a star of the early Internet age — each 
set in motion a change in course after coming under pressure 
from activists.  The events were the latest and most dramatic 
evidence of the increasing power of these shareholders to 
influence managements of storied American corporations.61 
 
As activism’s influence on corporate America has become evident, the 
resulting controversy has increased.  Moreover, many activists are brash 
and aggressive in their pursuit of corporate change contributing to the 
passionate discourse.62  The next section discusses the debate over 
activism. 
 
 
 
 60. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2007). 
 61. Schaap, supra note 37 (emphasis added). 
 62. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Their rowdiness seems calculated to distract 
managers, good or bad.  One prominent activist, Carl Icahn, likes to call chief executives ‘morons’ and 
tease them on Twitter.  Another, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square, has compared Herbalife, a firm he 
says is a fraud, to the Nazis.  When Dan Loeb went for Sotheby’s, its then chairman branded him a 
‘scumbag.’  Some have used dubious tactics, including building positions by stealth with derivatives.”). 
  
Spring 2016 SHAREHOLDER VALUE DRIVEN ACTIVISM 533 
III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER ACTIVISM 
 
A. OPPONENTS OF ACTIVISM 
 
There are differing viewpoints with respect to the questions raised by 
shareholder activism.  Detractors claim activism is damaging and should be 
curtailed arguing that the obsession with short term profits is a negative for 
companies63 and that activists exploit weakness for their personal 
enrichment.64  Moreover, the targets of activists often claim that company 
directors are distracted by the activism and are obligated to defend their 
companies and forced to spend large sums of money and time defending 
the corporate bastion.65  As one commentator noted, once a fund declares it 
owns a sizeable stake in a company, the directors and senior management 
are busy with the threat as opposed to running a profitable business.  “It 
wreaks havoc.  Now you have to manage a lot of other components that 
you didn’t before, and it’s all-consuming — none of which adds real 
value.”66 
BlackRock67 CEO Larry Fink has come out against activism stating 
that ‘“[i]t is critical, however, to understand that corporate leaders’ duty of 
care and loyalty is not to every investor or trader who owns their 
companies’ shares at any moment in time, but to the company and its long-
term owners,’” in addition to the fact that “they tend to first come up with 
ideas to enhance the value of an investment in the company, then buy 
shares with the objective of getting their ideas implemented.”68 
 
63.  See Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton's War on Hedge Fund Activists, AM. LAW. (Mar. 30, 
2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202721058301/Marty-Liptons-War-on-Hedge-Fund-Activ 
ists?slreturn=20150330052138. 
 64. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“A disgrace, say some; the cult of short-term 
shareholder value gone mad.  Activists have a reputation for stripping cash and assets and loading firms 
with debt.”). 
 65. This claim of needing to defend against a change of control is the topic of seminal rulings by 
the Delaware Supreme Court which uses “an enhanced scrutiny” test in evaluating measures taken to 
thwart activists.  The test seeks to balance the potential that directors and management seek to entrench 
themselves rather than “lose out” to an activist with the need to allow shareholders to reap profits.  See, 
e.g., Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 946. 
 66. Danielle Beurteaux, The Return of the Puppet Masters, ABSOLUTE RETURN + ALPHA (Dec. 9, 
2010), http://www.absolutereturn-alpha.com/Article/2728117/Search/The-return-of-the-puppet-masters. 
html?Keywords=puppet+masters. 
67.  The world’s largest single asset manager with nearly $5 trillion. BLACKROCK, http://www. 
blackrock.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).  However, even BlackRock has taken an incipient step 
towards becoming activist.  See Steven Davidoff Solomon, An Activism-Shy BlackRock Throws a 
Surprise Punch , N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016),  http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook 
/an-activism-shy-blackrock-throws-a-surprise-punch.html?_r=0 (“BlackRock, the enormous American 
asset manager with over $4.6 trillion of assets under management, has waged its first significant activist 
campaign around the G-Resources Group, a Hong Kong company that owned a gold mine.  It may be 
Hong Kong, and it may be only one campaign, but companies should be fearful.”). 
 68. Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: BlackRock Letter Delivers Subtle Warning to Corporate 
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To activist opponents, activism focuses solely on or excessively on 
short term results and is thus damaging to the economy of the United States 
and its equity markets.69  Referring to activists as “disastrous” and 
“vultures,” critics allege that activists destroy shareholder value, are bad for 
America, and are engaged in essentially illegal activity enabled by prior 
regulatory laxity and error.70 
Opponents of activist funds point to a growing body of studies 
suggesting that the benefits of activism may be exaggerated.71  Indeed, 
commentators point to several negative influences of activism.  
 
Although financial activism may return immediate wealth to 
some shareholders through the sale of assets, payment of 
special dividends or share buybacks, evidence is mounting 
that this may be at the expense of the longer term corporate 
and societal interests.  For example, a July 2014 paper by 
Yuan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge 
Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? (available 
 
Managers, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Apr. 17, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 2015/ 
04/17/dealpolitik-blackrock-letter-delivers-subtle-warning-to-corporate-managers/?mod=MarketsMain. 
 69. See Robert Lenzner, The Hedge Fund Activists are Not the Flavor of the Month for the Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Court, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robert 
lenzner/2014/03/30/activist-hedge-fund-corporate-meddlers-take-it-in-the-chops-from-the-high-and-
mighty/#250095db13e8 (noting how the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court criticizes hedge 
fund activists and “questions why the directors and managers of large public corporations ‘must follow 
the immediate whim of a momentary majority of shareholders’ tempted by the activists into some short-
term adventure that could push the stock up.”). 
 70. See Denning, supra  note 28 (“Activist Hedge Funds Are Vultures, Not Saviors . . . .  Thus 
activist hedge funds ferociously pursue ‘the dumbest idea in the world,’ namely, maximizing 
shareholder value as reflected in the current stock price.  Their activities lead to all disastrous 
consequences of that noxious theory.  Ironically, pursuit of shareholder value as reflected in the current 
stock price actually destroys real shareholder value . . . .   [T]he regulatory ‘safe harbor’ of 1982 that 
protects firms and activist hedge funds from prosecution for massive share buybacks amounting to 
stock price manipulation should be removed.”). 
71.  See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge 
Funds, HARV. L. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/ (referencing an 
empirical study conducted by Dr. Yvan Allaire, which concluded: 
 Hedge fund activists are not really that great at finance or strategy or operations, as 
some seem to believe (and as they relentlessly promote); 
 Their recipes are shop-worn and predictable, and (almost) never include any growth 
initiatives; 
 Their success mostly comes from the sale of the targeted firm (or from “spin-offs”); 
their performance otherwise barely matches the performance of the S&P 500 and 
that of a random sample of firms; 
 The strong support they receive from institutional investors is rather surprising and 
quite unfortunate; 
The form of “good” governance imposed on companies since Sarbanes-Oxley as well as the “soft” 
activism of institutional funds have proved a boon for the activist funds.). 
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atwww.igopp.org), concludes that “the most generous 
conclusion one may reach” is that activist funds “create 
some short-term wealth for some shareholders” because 
investors tend to jump into the stock of targeted companies 
upon the announcement of activist activity.  “In a minority of 
cases, activist hedge funds may bring some lasting value for 
shareholders but largely at the expense of workers and bond 
holders; thus the impact of activist hedge funds appears to 
take the form of wealth transfer rather than wealth creation.”  
The research further notes that hedge funds tend to be 
focused on the short term, with half of interventions not 
lasting nine months.  In addition, a growing number of 
commentators, including senior representatives of some 
institutional investors, have expressed concern about the 
impact of hedge fund activism, and associated increased debt 
and cuts in capital spending, on long-term corporate health, 
innovation, job creation and GDP growth.72 
 
Martin Lipton has been vociferous in his critique of activists73 and 
blames activism for a variety of problems:  
 
Much of what is wrong with America today — slow 
growth, widespread corporate scandals, inadequate 
investment in long-term projects, low wages that have not 
kept pace with inflation, wide swings in the economy 
accompanied by uncertain employment and rising 
inequality — is attributable to short-termism and attacks, 
and threats of attacks, by activist hedge funds.74 
 
Lipton built his legal practice on defending companies from 
takeovers75 and has drawn strong support from scholars who believe that 
activist funds do in fact cause damage.   
 
Scholars ranging from Columbia Law School’s John Coffee 
Jr. to Yvan Allaire of the Institute for Governance of Private 
 
 72. See Holly J. Gregory, The State of Corporate Governance for 2015, HARV. L. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/30/the-state-of-
corporate-governance-for-2015/. 
 73. See Goldhaber, supra note 63. 
 74. See Benoit, supra note 14. 
75.  Id. But see Andrew Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 268 (2015) 
(“Contemporary notions of good governance have led almost all existing public companies to shed 
takeover defenses.”). 
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and Public Organizations find the data ambiguous and 
methodologically flawed.  Both attribute any gains by 
shareholders to a combination of fleeting takeover premiums 
and wealth transfers from employees (as the result of layoffs 
or wage cuts) or bondholders (as the result of downgrades or 
bankruptcies).  In other words, Ackman and some 
shareholders are getting rich on the back of workers and 
pensioners.76 
 
According to detractors of activist investing, “the power of the activist 
hedge funds is enhanced by their frequent success in proxy fights and 
election contests when companies resist the short-term steps the hedge fund 
is advocating.”77  Opponents also cite to studies that allege long-term value 
is hurt by activists.   
 
The ability of shareholders, especially activist hedge funds, 
to determine changes in corporate policies or firm control in 
the short-term complicates both managerial-decision making 
and the extent to which other stakeholders want to invest in 
their relationship with the firm. . . .  In both cases, the result 
is a reduction in long-term firm value.  By enhancing 
shareholders’ ability to pressure directors and managers, 
hedge fund activism could thus exacerbate the shareholders’ 
limited commitment problem rather than acting as a 
beneficial corrective to managerial moral hazard.78 
 
These studies conclude that activist benefits are outweighed by 
negative consequences and while activism addresses legitimate governance 
issues, other alternatives might work better.  In fact the studies 
 
. . . have significant implications for the current corporate 
governance debate, as they challenge the desirability of an 
indiscriminate expansion of shareholder rights.  While we 
recognize that managerial moral hazard or having entrenched 
managers and directors are concrete risks in corporate 
governance, our research suggests that facilitating the 
 
 76. Benoit, supra note 14. 
 77. Martin Lipton, Current Thoughts About Activism, HARV. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/09/current-thoughts-
about-activism/#more-50945. 
 78. See Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value, 4 (Nov 19, 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231.  
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interventions of activist hedge funds might be an undesirable 
solution to address these risks.  Indeed, once one takes into 
account the full range of informational problems faced by 
shareholders — including both managerial moral hazard (or 
entrenchment) and the shareholder limited commitment 
problem — hedge fund activism may carry costs that seem 
to outweigh its potential benefits.  This also suggests that a 
desirable direction for future empirical research would be to 
investigate whether alternative corporate governance 
solutions exists that may better address the trade-offs posed 
by the multiple informational problems that imbue the 
shareholder-manager relationship.79  
 
Activist opponents also note that “[a]ctivist hedge funds have recently 
exploited loopholes in existing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) rules under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to 
accumulate significant, control-influencing stakes in public companies 
rapidly without timely notice to the market.”80  The Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, has also weighed in with a similar 
cautionary view of activists arguing that there is a vital need for more 
timely and comprehensive information regarding activist investments 
particularly when the activists seek to alter business strategies.  Echoing 
Lipton’s time delay criticisms, Justice Strine agrees with Lipton and has 
noted that he believes the delay in immediately reporting the five percent 
holding is problematic stating that Section 13(d) will need to be amended 
in response to “current technological and market developments.”81 Justice 
Strine has recently been joined by several U.S. Senators also advocating for 
a more stringent disclosure requirement.82  
 
79.  Cremers et. al., supra note 78.   See also Bill George, Dow-DuPont Raises Even More 
Concerns America Is Abandoning Corporate Research, FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2015, 1:47 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/12/dow-dupont-corporate-research-america/ (“In the struggle between 
research to fuel growth and cutbacks for short-term gains, financial engineers have the upper hand 
today.  While these financial machinations are pleasing short-term traders, the loser will be America’s 
superior research machine.  As a consequence, the U.S. could lose its global edge in research and badly 
damage its innovative spirit.”). 
 80. Lipton, supra note 77. 
 81. Michael J. de la Merced, S.E.C. Chief Sees Virtue in Activist Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/business/dealbook/sec-chief-sees-virtue-in-activist-investor 
s.html (“No less than Leo E. Strine Jr., the chief justice of Delaware’s Supreme Court  wearing a 
jaunty trilby hat at the conference this year  argued on a panel in favor of a more sensitive tripwire 
that involved disclosure within 24 hours.”).  For a discussion of hedge funds and 13(d) disclosure, see 
Slawotsky, supra note 25. 
82.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 496 (2014) (arguing that 
holders should “update[e] their filing within twenty-four to forty-eight hours if their ownership interest 
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B. SUPPORTERS OF ACTIVISM 
 
Proponents of activist investing disagree with the above-cited 
criticisms and argue that companies are positively influenced by 
shareholder activism.   
 
Because institutional investors ultimately decide whether an 
activist’s campaign will succeed, activism potentiates 
institutional voice by putting choices to the institutions . . . 
So in sidelining activist investors, the United Kingdom and 
the European Union are also sidelining the institutions — 
just those whose roles are simultaneously sought to be 
expanded into stewardship.83 
 
Lucian Bebchuk has written extensively about his research indicating 
that hedge fund activism is beneficial, with no accompanying evidence that 
activist funds bring adverse consequences either to their companies or to 
the economy.84 
Activism has in fact been extolled as highly beneficial, serving as a 
counter-balance to managerial entrenchment.  Carl Icahn argues as follows:  
 
True corporate democracy does not exist in America and as a 
result many unfit chief executives are not held accountable.  
Poison pills and other board tricks disenfranchise 
stockholders.  As a result entrenched chief executives and 
boards of directors may be protected even if they are 
ineffective.85 
 
Activists point to examples when activism positively exerted influence 
the company and rescued the shareholders from ineffective management. 
“One example . . . is railroad Canadian Pacific Railway, which languished 
for years under an inattentive management team base of investors.  Only  
after Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman got involved, were necessary 
operational and managerial changes made, to the benefit of long-term 
 
changes by one percent in any direction, long or short.”); Groden, supra note 26 (proposed bill to 
reduce the five percent disclosure obligation from ten to two days).  See also Letter from Wachtell et 
al., supra note 26 (arguing that the time period should be reduced to one day).   
 83. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 906 (2013). 
 84. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1085 (2015). 
 85. Rushton, supra note 30 (quoting Carl Icahn). 
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holders.”86 
 Studies have indicated that activism does in fact support enhanced 
corporate functioning.  The results of these studies, 
 
. . . suggest that hedge fund activism during the periods 
studied generated significantly higher abnormal stock returns 
during the window surrounding the announcement of 
activism than a control sample of passive block holders.  
This evidence further suggests that hedge fund activists 
achieved measurable success, at least in terms of traditional 
metrics of financial performance such as Tobin’s Q and 
stock price changes, and that these gains were not reversed 
over the longer term.  Indeed, Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 
(2013) finds that hedge fund activism through 2007 was 
followed by improved operating performance during the five 
years after intervention.87 
 
Moreover, activists help level the playing field with respect to 
management agency conflicts.  By leveraging the smaller holders to a 
powerful activist, the minority shareholders are empowered.88  There is 
support for the notion that activists have improved the financial outcomes 
of smaller holders and have indeed enhanced overall shareholder value.   
 
As shareholders of target companies, hedge funds have 
actively opposed several proposed acquisitions and have 
often succeeded in improving the terms of the transaction.  A 
recent example involved Novartis’s attempt to acquire the 
58% of Chiron that it did not already own.  Novartis initially 
offered $40 per share to the Chiron shareholders.  An 
independent committee of Chiron negotiated this price up to 
$45 per share, a 23% premium over Chiron’s pre-offer share 
price.  One month after the agreement was announced, 
ValueAct Capital, a hedge fund and the third largest 
shareholder of Chiron, sent a “stinging” letter to Chiron’s 
 
 86. Antoine Gara, Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t the Reason Capitalism is Coming Up Short, 
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/04/17/activist-hedge-
funds-arent-the-reason-capitalism-is-coming-up-short/. 
87.  C.N.V Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of 
Reputation, Clout, and Expertise (Dec. 8, 2015) (Vanderbuilt Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 15-9), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589992.  
 88. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1922 (2013) (arguing that activists have empowered themselves and other shareholders and the 
management agency problem has been substantially reduced). 
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CEO announcing its opposition.  This started a shareholder 
revolt, with mutual fund Legg Mason, the second largest 
shareholder of Chiron, joining ValueAct’s opposition, and 
Institutional Shareholder Services recommending a vote 
against the deal.  To get the transaction through, Novartis 
had to raise its offer to $48 a share, increasing the premium 
from 23% to 32%.89 
 
While activist opponents, such as Lipton, are big believers in 
corporate takeover defense, some have found that takeover defenses are 
positively correlated to companies with lower shareholder value.90  The fact 
that poison pills exist, it is argued, makes activism an important 
counterbalance to the power of management to deter legitimate change.91 
Significantly, activists are often supported by mainstream institutional 
holders.  “The hedge funds have done a marvelous job. No matter how we 
feel about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to 
achieve our aims.  We were right behind (the hedge funds), but we couldn’t 
have done it without them.”92  Accordingly, activists act as potential 
leaders emboldening smaller and otherwise passive shareholders to more 
effectively monitor, and if needed, correct corporate mismanagement.  The 
next section will discuss the debate in the context of the global corporate 
governance divide. 
 
IV. THE ISSUE OF ACTIVISM IN THE GLOBAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CONTEXT 
 
Corporate governance is acknowledged as a vital factor in creating 
superior economic performance93 and nations are endeavoring to improve 
governance.    
 
 89. Kahan & Rock, supra note 60, at 1037. 
 90. Although there is no evidence of causation, the correlation should be noted.  See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and The Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence From Two Natural 
Experiments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17127, 2011), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w17127.pdf (finding that staggered boards lead to lower firm value). See also Lucian Bebchuk at 
al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (staggered boards and 
poison pills linked to lower firm value). 
 91. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“One reason is that plenty of companies suffer 
from rotten management. About a tenth of big American firms, and even more smaller ones, still 
employ tactics like ‘poison pills’ and staggered boards that shelter incompetent managers.”). 
 92. Louise Armistead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 13, 
2005), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/article103547.ece. 
 93. See Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run 
Growth ( The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4469, Jan. 2008), https://openknowledge 
.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6443/wps4469.pdf?sequence=1. 
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Around the world, the corporate governance landscape is 
shifting, as efforts to improve business practices and policies 
gain support and momentum.  The wave of reform has 
become visible everywhere — from tough new regulations 
in Japan to sovereign wealth funds like Norway’s Norges 
Bank Investment Management taking a more active 
approach to their investments — and it is certain to continue 
rising.94 
 
There are various factors which are converging to incentivize nations 
to improve their competitive edge through superior governance.   
 
Three factors are driving these developments.  First, today’s 
deep economic uncertainty has broadened ordinary people’s 
awareness of the influence that companies have on politics, 
policy, and their own daily lives.  And, as I have noted 
previously, people are not only paying greater attention; they 
also have more power than ever before to make their voices 
heard.  Second, there has been a burgeoning awareness 
among governments that economic growth requires a 
proactive regulatory approach.  The third, and perhaps most 
important, factor underpinning recent changes in corporate 
governance has been the sharp rise in cross-border 
investing.95 
 
Is activism a virtuous component of improving a nation’s corporate 
governance?  A review of the various governance models is useful in 
examining the question.  Management agency conflicts such as shirking, 
looting and positional96 are commonly found in jurisdictions with generally 
widely dispersed shareholder bases (such as in the United States).97  In 
 
94.  Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015, 
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gove 
rnance. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Hedge-Fund Activism: Principle Costs, Agency Costs, 
and Governance Structures 15 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern Law 
Soshnick Colloquium on Law and Economics), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/coll 
oquium/law-economics/documents/2014_Goshen_Hedge_Fund.pdf. 
 97. This makes sense as smaller owners do not have the incentive or the time to pursue changes in 
a company.  A large owner has the monetary incentive to do so.  To monitor and pursue legal action is 
costly and of course by virtue of its large number of votes has influence in the company with respect to 
removing and electing directors and can pressure or even remove management via a proxy fight or 
takeover.  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders And Corporate Control, 94 J. OF 
POL. ECON. 461, 461 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 
J. OF FIN. 737, 753–54 (1997). 
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dispersed ownership jurisdictions, small individual owners have no 
influence on the company and managers have little or no concern for these 
owners.98  In jurisdictions such as Japan, while there is concentrated 
ownership, it is generally among allied companies, the outside individual 
shareholders are dispersed and hold relatively few shares.  In the absence of 
a substantial shareholder, controlling owners, together with managers and 
directors, are free to engage in self-serving strategy to the detriment of the 
outside shareholders and the company.  In the absence of the sword of 
disciplinary action over their heads, directors and managers are 
emboldened to treat the company’s resources as their own personal assets. 
The following sub-sections describe the contrasting models of corporate 
governance. 
 
A. SHAREHOLDER-VALUE MODEL 
 
United States corporate governance serves as the quintessential 
exemplar of the shareholder-value model.  United States corporate 
governance is concerned with the fiduciary relationship between 
management (directors, officers, and senior managers) and the shareholders 
in the context of conflicts of interest.  These divergent interests tend to 
manifest themselves in three sometimes overlapping ways known as 
management agency conflicts.  One tension is the shirking conflict where 
managers opt to concentrate on activities that will personally enrich 
themselves rather than focus on corporate profits.99  The second conflict is 
looting where the managers procure for themselves salaries and benefits 
not commensurate with their work contribution to the company or the 
results of the company.100  The third is positional where the managers seek 
to entrench themselves by ensuring that they cannot easily be replaced.101 
Illustrations of these conflicts can be gleaned from the case of Simon-
World-Wide, a publicly traded company in the United States, wherein a 
major shareholder alleged that the directors and officers were engaged in 
all three conflicts vis-à-vis the company and its shareholders.  In a 
regulatory filing, a major shareholder sent a letter to the company’s 
directors outlining the conflicts of interest between the company’s 
 
98.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 99. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COL. L. REV. 1461, 1471 
(1989)  (“All agents have a potential interest in working at a slack pace and in avoiding the effort and 
discomfort involved in adapting to changed circumstances, such as the emergence of new 
technologies.”). 
 100. Id. (“All agents have a potential interest in diverting the principal's assets to their own use.”). 
 101. Id. at 1472. (“[T]op corporate managers have the power to give expression to still a third 
potential divergence of interest: an interest in maintaining and enhancing their positions even at the 
shareholders' expense.”). 
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managers, directors, and the shareholders.102  The letter alleged that the 
directors: (1) had failed to hold a shareholders’ meeting for four years 
(positional conflicts), (2) were being paid exorbitant salaries in light of the 
business’s failure to earn any income (looting conflicts), and (3) were in 
fact not even working at their offices (shirking conflicts).103 
United States corporate governance is focused on addressing and 
deterring these conflicts.  Lawsuits are frequently filed in American courts 
alleging that a company’s managers were engaged in one or more of these 
conflicts which conflict with the shareholder-value mantra of United States 
corporate governance.104  Delaware courts have adopted standards for 
evaluating director conduct alleged to be tainted by these conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders.105 
Pursuant to the shareholder-value approach, shareholders — as 
owners of the business — are entitled to have the business run solely for 
the benefit of the shareholders.106  Under the shareholder-centric model, the 
directors are obligated to conduct the affairs of a company with the 
objective of profit maximization for the shareholders.107  The rationale in 
the shareholder-centric model is that the shareholders are the owners and 
therefore the risk-bearers since the shareholders have risked their capital to 
create a firm and employment opportunities.108  Because shareholders are 
vital to economic prosperity, and have placed their money at risk, they 
deserve to reap the rewards of their efforts.  This theme is central to judicial 
opinions in the United States that ascribe ultimate import to the 
shareholder-value standard in evaluating director conduct, obligating the 
directors to focus on shareholder profits and the corporation’s well-being.  
 
 102. Simon Worldwide Inc., Filing of Amendment to Schedule 13D (Form 13D/A) (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864264/000092189506001187/0000921895-06-001187.txt. 
 103. Simon Worldwide Inc., supra note 102. 
 104. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 283–84 (Del. Ch. 2003); see In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also Emon Reiser, Office Depot-
Staples Deal ‘Fraught with Conflict of Interest,’ Complaint Alleges, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:29 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2015/04/06/office-depot-staples-deal-fraught-with-
confl ict-of.html; see Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (alleging that directors 
were engaging in conflicts of interest with shareholders). 
 105. See Bernard Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under 
Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 393 (2014) (“Delaware is the state where the majority of the 
largest U.S. companies are incorporated, and its corporate law often serves as the authority that other 
U.S. states and countries look to when developing their own statutory and case law.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Revlon Inc., 506 A.2d at 183. (“Although such considerations [of non-stockholder 
corporate constituencies and interests] may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that 
prerogative.  A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). 
107.  Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (holding that board’s obligation is to act in “the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders”); see Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (1989).  
 108. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 2012), 
https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders. 
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Thus, under Delaware law, it is the responsibility of the directors to 
maximize shareholder value as opposed to looking out for the interests of 
other stakeholders.109  Directors in the United States may therefore have 
liability for conduct that inhibits or diminishes the profits of shareholders.  
 
B. ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER-VALUE MODEL 
 
The United States was historically not alone in having this 
shareholder-value focus.  The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada 
were also traditionally considered shareholder-value countries.  However, 
in recent years, the trend in these other historically shareholder-centric 
nations has been to mitigate the focus on profits by turning to what some 
have referred to as “enlightened shareholder value.”  Even some American 
political110 and business leaders111 have come to advocate this model. 
The United Kingdom has been the leader of the “enlightened 
shareholder” trend.112  Pursuant to this model, “corporations should pursue 
shareholder wealth with a long-run orientation that seeks sustainable 
growth and profits based on responsible attention to the full range of 
relevant stakeholder interests.”113  This approach was codified in the United 
Kingdom by the landmark Companies Act 2006, which represented a key 
shift away from the United States shareholder model towards a stakeholder 
model.114 
The Companies Act 2006 obligates directors to manage the company 
in the “best interests” of the business.115  “Best interest” is arguably in 
 
109.  See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price 
available); see Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining, 535 A.2d 1334 (1987) (upholding directors’ 
defensive measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill agreement to thwart 
activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer).  
 110. See Slawotsky, supra note 7 (“Critics of America’s shareholder-centric model allege that it is 
archaic and a failure, and they believe that the American version of capitalism must undergo a dramatic 
shift toward a stakeholder-based model emulating other nations . . . .  President Obama recently echoed 
the ‘sustainable capitalism’ theme by calling for major changes that would enhance the interests of 
other stakeholders in order to construct an economy ‘built to last.’”). 
 111. See James Surowiecki, A Fair Day’s Wage, NEW YORKER, (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/09/fair-days-wage (noting Aetna’s CEO Mark Bertolini 
stating “[c]ompanies are not just money-making machines” and commenting on pay raises: “[f]or the 
good of the social order, these are the kinds of investments we [corporations] should be willing to 
make.”). 
112.  Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened 
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L CO. AND COMM. L. REV. 
329, 339 (2006).  
 113. DAVID MILLON, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility and the Redefinition of 
Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Ch. 4 
(Edward Elgar, 2012). 
 114. See Keay, supra note 5; see also Aguilera, supra note 5. 
 115. See John Lowry, Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 
2006, INT’L REV. OF L. 5 (2012). 
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between pure shareholder and stakeholder — a sort of middle ground.116  
This middle ground is referred to as “enlightened shareholder value” or 
“sustainable capitalism”117 and clearly marks a shift in United Kingdom 
(“U.K.”) governance towards a stakeholder model.118  The fiduciary 
obligations of U.K. directors were thus broadened by the 2006 U.K. 
Companies Act to encompass interests other than shareholders.  U.K. 
directors are now obligated to act to promote the “success of the company,” 
which envisions taking into account a varied list of stakeholders including: 
employees, suppliers, customers, environmental concerns, the community, 
and reputational business conduct.119 
Directors in the U.K. are therefore under the threat of potential civil 
liability for failure to take into regard these other stakeholders when 
making business decisions.120  The enlightened shareholder model has also 
made advances into traditionally shareholder-value nations, such as 
Canada.121 
 
C. STAKEHOLDER VALUE MODEL 
 
The stakeholder value model is popular in the European Union and 
Asia, and is growing globally122 although in an example of a 
“counterattack,” the shareholder value-centric approach is also making 
inroads into Norway, a historically stakeholder-centric jurisdiction.123  
 
 116. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 493, 500 (2005). 
 117. See, e.g., Gore & Blood, supra note 9 (“Before the crisis and since, we and others have called 
for a more responsible form of capitalism, what we call sustainable capitalism: a framework that seeks 
to maximize long-term economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while integrating 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics throughout the decision-making process.”). 
 118. Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-
Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the US and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 271, 293 (2009). 
 119. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.). 
 120. Lowry, supra note 115. 
 121. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008), [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (BCE), at para 81 (Canadian 
Supreme Court ruled that directors must balance various stakeholder interests “in accordance with their 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.” 
(emphasis added).  The court in fact stated “[i]n considering what is in the best interests of the 
corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions.”  Id. at par. 40.  See also 
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] SCC 68 (Can.), at para 42 (“We accept as 
an accurate statement of law that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the 
board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment.”).  
122. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 11; see also Corrine M. Fiesel, Fiduciary Duties of Directors, 
Corporate, Governance and the end of Shareholder Primacy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Butterworths, 2004).  
 123. See BLANPLAIN ET AL., supra note 2 (Norway has a stakeholder model of governance as 
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Under the stakeholder model, where the company is considered as a nexus 
of “unwritten” contracts between various constituencies of the business 
who may have an interest in it, it is the contract which determines the rights 
and obligations of the various stakeholders.124  In terms of corporate 
governance and company law, directors are to make decisions that take into 
account the interests of these various “constituents” who are considered as 
having “rights” in the company.  These stakeholders in the business 
encompass a wide array of interests including: creditors, employees, 
suppliers, customers, the environment, and the community. 
Pursuant to this governance architecture, the goal of a business should 
not be strictly a grab for profits and shareholder returns.  Rather, other 
interests should be afforded a voice in corporate decision making.  By 
taking into account the concerns of not only shareholders but employees, 
consumers, suppliers, the environment, local community impact, and the 
wider global audience, the company’s success becomes the interest of 
numerous stakeholders.  Presumably, numerous stakeholders will 
encourage the company’s long-term success.  Therefore, under the 
stakeholder theory, director conduct that favors non-shareholders may not 
necessarily constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty since the directors are 
permitted to take into account and in fact possibly favor non-shareholders.  
For example, pursuant to a stakeholder approach, a merger bid for a 
higher share price may result in environmental degradation, and therefore 
be voted down in favor of a lower bid from a rival with a better 
environmental record, or a commitment not to pollute.  Or directors could 
favor customers, suppliers, or any stakeholder under the banner of 
enlightened shareholder value.  In the European Union, for example, 
affirmative action programs are viewed in the broader context of 
governance, as diversity in the boardroom constitutes a stakeholder value.   
 
The European Union and its member states are also taking 
an increasingly active approach to corporate governance, 
including regulations concerning boardroom diversity.  Italy, 
France, Spain, Norway and others have all enacted 
boardroom gender quotas, with companies required to fill 
 
opposed to a shareholder model).  But see Ruth Sullivan, Norwegian Wealth Fund Set to Raise Bar on 
Governance, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 6:41 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea0ede56-0fc9-11e3-
99e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zs3qenxh (Norway’s state owned SWF is shifting its traditional 
corporate social responsibility based activism towards a broadening scope of activism to include 
shareholder value.  The Norwegian SWF is therefore moving towards a profits-centric shareholder 
value activism); see also Investor Muscle, FIN. TIMES (Aug 8, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s /0/8eeb7524-002f-11e3-9c40-00144feab7de.html#axzz2zs3qenxh. 
 124. See Xin Denga et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: 
Evidence from Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87, 87–88 (2013).  
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30-40% of independent board seats with women.  The latest 
example can be found in Germany, where, after much 
debate, new quotas require that from 2016 large companies 
fill 30% of non-executive board seats with women.125 
 
Thus, in a stakeholder jurisdiction, if the impact of a proposed 
transaction could result in mass layoffs, then directors may be empowered 
to block the transaction.  In the context of a sale, directors in stakeholder 
nations may be correct in exercising their business judgment by accepting a 
lower offer if the lower offer arises from a competing bidder that has 
agreed not to terminate employees or a bidder that will be more 
community-oriented or will donate ten percent of profits to a human rights 
organization.  This would be distinguishable from the shareholder model of 
the United States and its Revlon duties wherein directors are obligated to 
achieve the maximum profit for the shareholders.   
In Delaware, directors owe Revlon duties once a sale of the 
corporation has been decided.126  Revlon duties mandate that the directors 
obtain the best price possible for shareholders.  In the United States 
accepting a lower offer for any of the above-stated reasons would constitute 
a violation of directors’ fiduciary obligations.  In a shareholder-value 
model, social or societal considerations are of little or no interest in the 
drive for profits.  In contrast, in a stakeholder-model, society’s interest in 
advancing diversity may constitute a “stakeholder interest.”  
In a shareholder-value model, enacting measures that make activist 
conduct more difficult will be examined in light of the interests of the 
shareholder.  But in a stakeholder model, blocking activists may be seen as 
acceptable or even beneficial if the activist plans to consolidate divisions 
and terminate the excess employees.  Under the stakeholder-model, the 
potential permutations represent a daunting challenge in balancing various 
stakeholder interests. 
  
D. WILL U.S. STYLE ACTIVISM SPREAD?  
 
As a shareholder-value-driven jurisdiction, the mantra of enhanced 
shareholder returns fosters an environment conducive to activism in the 
United States.  As discussed above, activism is thriving in the United States 
and has become a mainstream tactic to enhance shareholder returns.  
 
 
 125. Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015, 
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gov 
ernance. 
 126. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available). 
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Shareholder activism has been slower to arrive in nations where 
shareholder-value is not the modus operandi of corporate law.  Indeed, in 
many non-U.S. jurisdictions, activism is not viewed as virtuous and has not 
been embraced.   
 
European and Asian shareholders say they do not need 
activists because they have more power than American 
investors over managers’ pay and appointments. They 
typically dismiss Mr. Icahn and his friends as an American 
solution to an American problem.  And, for cultural 
reasons, the few European activists tend to be more 
diplomatic and consultative than their brash cousins.127 
 
However, despite previous reservations or hostility, activists are 
beginning to copy the strategy in non-U.S. markets.128  This is hardly a 
surprising development since “at the end of the day, American 
shareholders, European shareholders and U.K. shareholders all want the 
same thing . . . .  We all want to make money and we all want management 
and the board to work in alignment to create shareholder value.”129  
Activist investing is spreading globally,130 beginning to appear, for 
example, in Australia,131 Japan132 and Germany.133  Even in India, where 
“[s]hareholders in listed companies . . . are known for their apathy towards 
 
 127. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18.  See also Marlow, infra note 129 (“[T]he brash 
approach has been less effective in the more conservative and stuffy boardrooms of Europe and the UK, 
where pushy outsiders can find it difficult to exert any real influence.”). 
 128. Marco Becht et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (Oct. 30, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Erasmus Research Institute of Management), 
http://www.erim.eur.nl/fileadmi n/erimcontent/documents/Wagner1104.pdf. 
129.   Alexandra Stevenson, U.S. Activist Investor Turns Eyes Toward Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 
2014, 4:00 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/u-s-activist-investor-turns-eyes-toward-
europe/?module=BlogPostTitle&version=BlogMain&contentCollection=CorporateGovernance&action
=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body.  See also Ben Marlow, Bosses beware: Activist raiders are 
targeting UK plc, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ 
11808504/Bosses-beware-Activist-raiders-are-targeting-UK-plc.html (“After years of false starts, it 
looks like shareholders are starting to demand change at some of Britain’s big corporates.”). 
 130. Stevenson, supra note 129  (“It was only a matter of time before United States activist 
investors turned their focus to European companies.”). 
 131. Paul Garvey, Activist Hedge Funds are Coming, but are Investors Ready?, THE AUSTRALIAN 
(Apr. 21, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/activist-hedge-funds-
are-coming-but-are-investors-ready/story-fn91v9q3-1227312571622. 
 132. Lawrence Delevingne, Keith Meister’s Corvex Takes Large Stake in Yum Brands: Sources, 
CNBC (May 1, 2015, 10:54 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102631443 (noting activist hedge fund 
Third Point’s growing activities in Japan). 
 133. See also Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst, Corporate Governance Convergence in 
Germany Through Shareholder Activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse Bid for London Stock 
Exchange, 16 J. MGMT. & GOV. 235 (2012) (discussing activism in the context of German corporate 
governance). 
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corporate governance and lack of active participation in companies’ 
decision-making process,”134 activism is starting to develop.  In fact, “[i]n 
recent times, especially due to the passage of investor friendly provisions in 
the new Companies Act of 2013 and an increasingly proactive role played 
by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI), there has been 
increasing shareholder activism and participation in the country.”135 
Although many continental European nations have a concentrated 
shareholder ownership system whereby insiders, banks or families own 
large percentages of shares thus “controlling” the company, shareholder 
activists have commenced their activity.  “Shareholder activism is an ever-
present challenge to corporations in the US. Now, the trend has spread to 
Europe.”136  In Italy, where concentrated ownership is common, scholars 
have noted that activists have met with mixed success.137   
 
Activists have demanded the break-up of Dutch financial 
institution ABN AMRO, pressured the Italian oil company 
ENI to restructure its operations, launched a proxy fight 
against the management of French multinational Atos, and 
succeeded in blocking Deutsche Boerse’s attempts to take 
over the London Stock Exchange and oust its CEO.138 
 
In another example, even South Korean shareholders — historically 
not conducive to activists139 — have concluded that governance is 
 
 134. See Jay Sayta, Era of Shareholder Activism?, THE STATESMAN (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www. 
thestatesman.com/news/supplements/era-of-shareholder-activism/106554.html (“However, in recent 
times, especially due to the passage of investor friendly provisions in the new Companies Act of 2013 
and an increasingly proactive role played by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI), there 
has been increasing shareholder activism and participation in the country.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Latham & Watkins: Shareholder Activism is on the Rise, EUROPEAN CEO (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.europeanceo.com/business-and-management/latham-watkins-shareholder-activism-is-on-
the-rise/ (“[A]ctivists in Europe have taken a more cooperative approach due to differing characteristics 
in the legal and business framework.  Historically speaking, this framework amounts to a less 
confrontational tone in business communications and management approach from institutional 
shareholders, greater union powers, mandatory co-determination requirements, and a requirement for 
actions to focus on all stakeholders, not just shareholders.”). 
 137. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of 
Concentrated and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421; Matteo Erede, Governing 
Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: Can Hedge Fund Activism Play Any Role in 
Italy?, CLEA ANNUAL MEETING PAPER (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra 
ctid=1397562. 
 138. See Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons From the 
American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438 (2014). 
 139. U.S. Hedge Fund Galvanizes Korean Shareholders to Pressure Samsung, South Korea’s 
Richest Family, FOX BUS. (June 24, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2015/06/24/us-
hedge-fund-galvanizes-korean-shareholders-to-pressure-samsung-south-korea/. 
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important and are objecting to being unfairly treated.140 
Activists have commenced making incipient inroads in Japan,141 after 
having failed for decades.142  Activists are somewhat emboldened as they 
perceive recent moves towards governance reforms favorably.143 For 
example, activist investor Third-Point  
 
“continued to add to” its investment in Seven & i, it said in a 
letter to investors Friday, without disclosing how large of a 
stake it holds.  It also proposed the Japanese company’s unit 
Ito-Yokado Co., which has “notable record of 
underperformance,” should be spun off and restructured as a 
standalone company.144 
 
Notwithstanding these stirrings, as discussed in Part V, activism in 
Japan is sharply limited due to both the governance structure and the 
business environment.  
While activists are likely to continue their efforts in non-U.S. nations, 
success in these jurisdictions will depend on the extent the activist can 
acquire an adequate number of shares to vote directors onto the board and 
replace managers.  Cultural business norms will also substantially influence 
the prospects of a successful activist campaign.  Therefore, the governance 
architecture and business environment are key to determining whether 
activism can thrive thus forcing inefficient businesses to become more 
productive.  The next section examines Japan and the difficulty activists 
face because of the governance model as well as the corporate culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Dave McCombs & Jason Clenfield, Japan Inc.’s $104 Billion Investor Payout Set to Surge, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 28, 2015, 11:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-
27/japan-inc-s-104-billion-investor-payout-set-to-surge (“In an example that would have been 
inconceivable in years past, the secretive robot-maker Fanuc Corp. was prodded by American activist 
Daniel Loeb into doubling the percentage of profit it would return to shareholders.”). 
 142. Id. (“Loeb’s success with Fanuc may be a sign foreign activists will finally find success in 
Japan after decades of failure”). 
 143. See Tsuyoshi Inajima, Loeb’s Third Point Takes Stake in Japan’s Seven & I Holdings, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 31, 2015, 6:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
31/loeb-s-third-point-takes-stake-in-japan-s-seven-i-holdings (“Loeb’s investments come as he has 
extolled Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to improve corporate governance, saying the move opens 
the way for activist investors to gain by helping improve the way companies deploy cash.  The Seven & 
i investment is at least Loeb’s fifth in two years in Japan and follow his bets in Suzuki Motor Corp., 
robot maker Fanuc Corp., Sony Corp. and jet engine maker IHI Corp.”). 
 144. Id.  
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V.  IS SHAREHOLDER-VALUE DRIVEN ACTIVISM VIRTUOUS? 
 
The context of governance models provides an excellent framework 
from which to examine whether activism is virtuous.  The above section 
provided the general parameters of the various systems.  The Article now 
examines Japan and discusses whether hostility to shareholder activism has 
negatively implications for economic performance.  
 
A.  DISCOURAGING ACTIVISM: THE EXAMPLE OF JAPAN 
 
Japan holds stakeholder value as the corporate mantra.145  However, 
Japanese corporate governance and the corporate environment makes clear 
that “stakeholder value” is dedicated to the interests of the select “corporate 
community.”  This community consists of insiders, key employees, and 
allied companies — the popular Keiretsu ownership structure — wherein 
numerous allied entities have a crossholding in each other.146  Significantly, 
these cross-holdings greatly reduce the importance of outside shareholders 
as “outsiders” cannot meaningfully challenge the incumbent managers and 
board due to a lack of voting power.  Therefore, the prevalence of Keiretsu 
groups substantially reduces the ability to implement a hostile take-over: 
“[t]here are many more friendly mergers, which typically occur between 
Keiretsu and other related firms, than mergers based on hostile takeovers. 
Most hostile takeovers of poorly functioning firms or takeover attempts 
have failed.”147 
Moreover, in Japan, the corporate culture fosters conformity and 
loyalty within this corporate community.  A large number of parties are 
thus allied with each other and constitute “company insiders” in the sense 
that these interests and loyalties are with the company and its senior 
management rather than to overall shareholder performance or the interests 
 
145.  Carlo Osi, Board Reforms with a Japanese Twist: Reviewing the Japanese Board of Directors 
with a Delaware Lens, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 325, 336, 352 (2009) (“In post-war corporate 
Japan, corporations are primarily managed for the stakeholders.  This includes employees, banks, 
suppliers, customers, business partners, the community and, in some respect, shareholders. This 
stakeholder-oriented model is quite different from the shareholder primacy model advocated in the 
United States.”).  
146.   See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate 
Law and their Solutions, 25 Del. J Corp. Law 189, 202 (2000) (“The Company Community consists of 
management, board members, and core employees who share an identity as ‘company men.’  In Japan, 
the word “company” refers to the collective Company Community . . . .  Within their own minds, 
members of the Company Community owe their loyalty to both the Community itself and their fellow 
members.”). 
 147. Masao Nakamura, Has Japan’s corporate governance reform worked? EAST ASIA F. (Oct. 23, 
2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/23/has-japans-corporate-governance-reform-worked/. 
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of other “outside” shareholders.148  Corporate insiders are loyal to each 
other and enjoy interlocking relationships which confer benefits to club 
members.149 
The prevalence and entrenchment of these Keiretsu cross-holdings 
dissuade foreign capital and other potential outside shareholders from 
risking capital in these businesses.150  Interestingly, these cross-holders, 
who are in effect the quintessential loyal long-term investors, have reaped 
the adverse financial consequences of their passivity.151  While the Keiretsu 
structure has diminished over the last several years, it remains a powerful 
characteristic of corporate Japan.152 
Moreover, in corporate Japan, values such as loyalty, honor, and 
fidelity trump shareholder value.153  These values are applicable to the 
relationship among the senior managers and officers, allied companies, 
business partners, and other insider stakeholders; they do not apply to 
outsiders, nonaffiliated businesses, and “other” shareholders.  The 
corporation’s outside owners’ interests lie dormant at the bottom of the 
pyramid.154  Allied investors will continue to support a scandal plagued 
business rather than institute reform.  For example: 
 
 
148.  Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 483, 49596 (2011) (“If one company has difficulties, it is likely to be assisted by other 
companies from the same keiretsu (the same as the villagers would help each other in case of 
calamities); more powerful companies are expected to support smaller ones.  The sense of obligation 
towards the company may be linked with the sense of belonging to a family and the responsibility 
towards one's own family.  In the same sense, keiretsu also represents a kind of family with members 
that feel close to each other.  In this sense, keiretsu is not purely an economic concept but a cultural one, 
as well.”) 
149.  Such insiders include senior officers, directors, government regulators, allied companies within 
the keiretsu and other loyal parties.  The allegiance to each other among insiders trumps all other 
interests.  See Osi, supra note 145, at 325 (discussing the phenomenon of conformity and loyalty in 
Japan and the importance of banding together against outsiders.  Also the fact that government 
regulators know that they will land well-paying jobs post-government if they “play the game.”).  As 
will be detailed below, the recent Olympus and Toshiba frauds exemplify these characteristics of 
corporate Japan.  See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, infra note 153. 
 150. See Leo Lewis, Japanese Banks to Accelerate Unwind of Cross-Shareholdings, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf714ea6-8b76-11e5-8be4-3506bf20cc2b.ht 
ml#axzz3rejueQj6 (“The cozy, opaque relationships locked into the cross-shareholdings, say analysts, 
are among many turn-offs for would-be investors.”). 
151.  See Shuli Ren, Japan’s Corporate Governance Woes, BARRONS (Oct. 24, 2015), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/japans-corporate-governance-woes-1445665396 ("Japan’s banks suffer 
by operating as passive investors."). 
 152. See Lewis, supra note 150. 
 153. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford Blows Whistle on Company, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/15742048 (“But it’s a culture of deference and sycophants and yes men.  I 
mean in Japan people respect the position without questioning the person who takes and assumes that 
position.”). 
 154. As noted below, this disregard for outside shareholders has played a significant role in 
discouraging badly needed capital investment. 
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Despite ISS’ shareholder-rights campaign, the presidents of 
Japan’s top 200 companies received median voting support 
of 96.6% . . . .  Even the president of Toshiba (6502.Japan), 
which lost a third of its market value from an accounting 
scandal and write-downs, got a 94% approval rating. Some 
76% and 91% of investors voted against dividend hikes and 
share buybacks, respectively.155 
 
Japan’s governance architecture and business culture is not friendly to 
outsiders and represents:  
 
. . . a deeply insular culture. Only 274 of some 40,000 
directorships are held by foreigners.  A mesh of 
shareholdings still binds big firms together.  Japan’s 
business lobby group, Keidanren, fought to dilute the new 
reforms.  The banks still keep weak companies afloat: the 
fact that not one of Japan’s listed firms went bankrupt last 
year, for the first time since 1991, reflects not just a zippier 
economy, but also lenders’ clubby ties to borrowers.  For 
all his reformist zeal, Mr Abe has yet to embrace measures 
that make it easier for firms to hire and fire.  Hobbesian, 
Japan is not.156 
 
Viewed as outsiders, it is thus hardly surprising that activists have not been 
welcomed by other shareholders.157 
Another manifestation of Japan’s lack of good corporate governance 
is Japan’s common “parent-child” ownership structure, which is viewed by 
activists as an invitation to abuse.158 Activists have accordingly focused 
their energy on these parent-child situations.159  This is “. . . mainly a 
 
 155. Ren, supra note 151. 
 156. See Meet Shinzo Abe, Shareholder Activist, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), http://www. 
economist.com/news/leaders/21653610-last-japan-has-introduced-corporate-governance-reforms-will-
make-difference-meet-shinzo.  
157 .  See Kana Inagaki, Japan Is Hostile to Activist Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2013, 12:47 
PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578482943175923954  (“Big   
Japanese investors have generally circled the wagons to protect companies — with which they often 
had deep shareholding and business ties — from intervention by outsiders.  Historically, those networks 
of big investors held large enough stakes that they could prevent hostile campaigns from succeeding.”).   
 158. Tom Redmond & Toshiro Hasegawa, Japan Post’s Unique IPO Turns Spotlight on Parent-
Child Listings, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 28, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2015-10-29/japan-post-s-unique-ipo-turns-spotlight-on-parent-child-listings (“Such listings are 
already decreasing, according to data from Nomura.  They fell to 284 at the end of March, an eighth 
straight year of declines since 2007, when the Tokyo bourse said in a statement that parent-child 
arrangements were “not always desirable.”). 
 159. Id.  
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problem if units don’t increase their independence from the parent after 
listing and eventually become separate entities . . . .  This has been a 
common pattern in Japan.”160  
In a bid to reform governance and bring it in line with global “best 
practices” Japan Post is being privatized.161  As a result: 
 
That’s putting the spotlight back on a practice seen as open 
to abuse: parent-child listings.  The structure is a ‘barbarous 
relic’ that has largely disappeared from other markets, 
according to CLSA Ltd.’s Nicholas Smith, a strategist at the 
brokerage, who notes the possibility for listed subsidiaries to 
be plundered by their parents or forced into unprofitable 
business at their behest.162 
 
In sum, ordinary owners — the individual outside shareholders who 
are not part of the web of alliances — are disdained.  Therefore, the key 
distinction between the United States and Japanese models of corporate 
governance is Japan’s low regard for the interests of outside corporate 
owners and high regard for the other stakeholders.  In Japan, the interest of 
non-insider shareholders is at the bottom of the pyramid, while other 
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, creditors, and particularly the 
“corporate community” of key insiders and allied companies, all trump the 
interests of outside shareholders.163 
Thus, the lack of vigorous activism in Japan to date has been caused 
by a lack of truly outside shareholders and the Japanese business culture, 
which has been hostile to activism for many years.164  The inability to 
acquire a significant let alone a controlling percentage of shares prevents an 
activist from influencing a company, let alone replacing the directors.  
Moreover, unlike the United States, the other large holders are likely to 
side with their fellow club insiders since concern for shareholder value is 
not as important as loyalty and fidelity to allied interests.  The difficulties 
 
 160. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra note 158.  
 161. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra  note 158 (“It seems likely that changes in corporate governance 
codes will ultimately put an end to this barbarous relic,” Smith wrote in a report this year.  “Parent-child 
listings seem a clear violation of the principle of equal treatment of shareholders.”) 
 162. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra note 158. 
 163. Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 483, 48990 (2011). 
 164. See Dave McCombs & Jason Clenfield, Japan Inc.’s $104 Billion Investor Payout Set to Surge, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 27, 2015, 11:29 pm),  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-
27/japan-inc-s-104-billion-investor-payout-set-to-surge (“In the early 1990s, hostile-takeover pioneer T. 
Boone Pickens said he was giving up on Japan after losing a battle to gain a board seat at auto-parts 
maker Koito Manufacturing Co. Steel Partners Chairman Warren Lichtenstein ultimately abandoned his 
takeover bid for beer-maker Sapporo Holdings Inc. in 2007.”). 
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activists have encountered may very well be both a symptom of the 
economic malaise afflicting Japan and an impediment to an improvement. 
 
1. The Economic Context 
 
After World War II, Japan enjoyed robust economic growth which at 
its peak created the world’s second biggest economy, just behind the 
United States.165  Japan’s fall from second place is starkly framed when 
viewed from the perspective of the 1980s when Japan was perceived to 
possibly overtake the United States.166   
 
For Japan, whose economy has been stagnating for more 
than a decade, the figures reflect a decline in economic and 
political power.  Japan has had the world’s second-largest 
economy for much of the last four decades, according to the 
World Bank.  And during the 1980s, there was even talk 
about Japan’s economy some day overtaking that of the 
United States.167 
 
However, Japan’s performance has been so lackluster that it has fallen 
behind China, and is now the world’s number three economy.  Japan is 
perilously close to slipping to the fourth position and being replaced by 
India.168  By some measures India has already taken the number three 
position from Japan.169 
Japan’s economic downturn commenced in the early 1990s and has 
continued into 2016 — a twenty-five year malaise coinciding with the rise 
of intensified globalization and competition.  The Japanese economy has 
 
165. See Justin McCurry & Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan’s World’s Second-Largest 
Economy, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb 
/14/china-second-largest-economy  (“China has leapfrogged Japan to become the world's second-largest 
economy, a title Japan has held for more than 40 years.”). 
 166. Dhruva Jaishankar, The Specter of Japan-Like Stagnation, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 19, 2015, 10:35 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/02/19/japans-economic-stagnation-is-a-
cautionary-tale-for-europe  (“By the 1980s, Japan was a global economic powerhouse, giving us Sony, 
Toyota and Nintendo, pioneering the bullet train and buying up American real estate.  Business leaders 
the world over scrambled to learn the secrets behind the country’s success.”). 
167.  David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=all. 
168. See Enda Curran & Keiko Ujikane, Planes, Trains and Automobiles Showcase Japan 
Innovation Push, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 4, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2016-01-04/planes-trains-and-automobiles-showcase-japan-innovation-push (“As part of Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s drive to reinvigorate the world’s third-largest economy.”). 
 169. See Ankit Panda, World Bank: India Overtakes Japan as World’s Third Largest Economy, 
DIPLOMAT (May 1, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/world-bank-india-overtakes-japan-as-worlds 
-third-largest-economy/ (noting World Bank conclusion that Japan had fallen into fourth place). 
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been marked by recession, deflation, and low growth for many years.170  In 
fact, Japan entered its fourth recession in twenty years in 2015.171 
 
2. Recognizing Governance as a Problem 
 
In response to this economic under-performance, corporate 
governance reform has become an urgent task.172  Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe has urged companies to transform their corporate governance “with 
more transparency and independent board members.”173  Abe has pressured 
Japanese companies to become more attractive to foreign investors noting 
Japan requires more capital from global investors.174  
As a result, “[t]he main focus of these changes . . . is really to bring 
Japanese board practices in line with other western countries in a bid to 
attract greater investment from overseas institutions . . . .  Abe’s 
government is seeking ‘a total governance revolution.’”175  
The reforms seek to foster “a more equal environment among 
shareholders, by ensuring more disclosure and transparency, by specifying 
the responsibilities of company boards, and by requiring outside 
independent directors on company boards, the codes enshrine changes that 
make Japan more attractive for foreign investors.”176 
  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is prodding companies to become more 
responsive to shareholders.  Abe[’s] advisers worked with the Tokyo Stock 
 
170.  See OECD Economic Surveys: JAPAN 4 (Apr. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Japan-
2015-overview.pdf  (“Two decades of sluggish growth and persistent deflation have reduced Japanese 
living standards below the OECD average.”).  
171.  See Keiko Ujikane, Japan Falls Into Recession for Second Time Under ‘Abenomics,’ 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 15, 2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
15/japan-s-economy-contracted-entered-recession-in-third-quarter (“Japan’s economy contracted in the 
third quarter as business investment fell, confirming what many economists had predicted: The nation 
fell into its second recession since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in December 2012.”). 
 172. See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“Noting the generally robust performance of the economies of 
the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, the Japanese government decided to adopt a US 
(or, more broadly, Anglo-American) style corporate governance system over the last decade or so. A 
range of corporate governance reforms were instituted, aiming to facilitate market based transactions, 
competition, individual shareholder rights, as well as transparency and information disclosure.  Japan’s 
economic regulatory institutions were also reformed.  New laws were introduced and existing laws 
revised, including company law, the commercial code, the anti-monopoly law, and the financial 
instruments and exchange act.”). 
173.  Chris Cooper, Season of Scandal Hits Japan with Flurry of Corporate Confessions, JAPAN 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/21/business/season-scandal-hits-
japan-flurry-corporate-confession/#.VkWQSnYrK70. 
 174. Id.  
 175. See Foreign Investors and Japanese Corporate Governance, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL (July 
20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/foreign-investors-and-japanese-corporate-gove 
rnance/. 
 176. Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015, 
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gove 
rnance. 
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Exchange to develop the JPX-Nikkei Index 400, also known as the Shame 
Index to get companies focused on investors and profitability.  Now 
companies from Mitsubishi Corp. to Hoya Corp. are raising dividends and 
announcing billions of dollars worth of share buybacks.  Others including 
Hitachi Ltd. have adopted performance-based pay for executives and 
bellwethers such as Sony Corp. are setting targets for return on equity, a 
measure that tends to rise with dividends and buybacks. 177 
Under the new governance code, Japanese corporations must explain 
why they have ownership interests in various entities.  “The cozy, opaque 
relationships locked into the cross-shareholdings, say analysts, are among 
many turn-offs for would-be investors.”178  Corporate Japan has 
commenced reducing these cross-holdings: 
 
. . . actually starting to realize some of their cross-
shareholdings, which frees up capital within the business, 
not only to return to shareholders but also to focus on more 
capital efficiency within the organization. Quite often that 
leads to enhanced shareholder returns either in the shape of 
dividends or share buybacks.179 
 
However, it remains to be seen whether these governance proposals 
will in fact be the tonic Japan urgently needs.180  Recent examples 
demonstrate that real reform will be difficult to implement.181  Despite 
promises, a transformed governance architecture, systemic failures 
continue to plague Japan.182  As will be discussed in the following sub-
section, the Olympus and Toshiba frauds are a manifestation of deeply 
embedded traits of corporate loyalty, cover-up, and lack of accountability 
 
 177. See McCombs & Clenfield, supra note 164. 
 178. See Lewis, supra note 150. 
 179. See Foreign Investors, supra note 175. 
 180. See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But have the issues that motivated the reforms been solved in 
the decade since they were adopted?  Has the market for corporate control achieved competitive market 
principles, transparency and information disclosure?  And was the share value maximization principle 
fully adopted by Japanese managers?  The answer to these questions are mostly no.  This was largely 
predictable given Japan’s historical reaction to the transplantation of Western institutions over the long 
sweep of history since the Meiji Restoration in 1868.”). 
181.  See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But the fact that the problem was continuing even though 
Toshiba had already implemented a US-style executive committee board system is an example of 
reform failure.  Clearly their outside directors did not function as expected. And neither did the 
accounting firm that audited Toshiba.”). 
 182. See Cooper, supra note 173 (“Three companies disclosed internal malfeasance in the space of 
24 hours last week, including a firm that says one of its units tried to cover up the faulty construction of 
an apartment building that started to tilt, and another that says one of its units falsified reports on the 
quality of rubber used in trains and ships.  The admissions come after Toshiba Corp. admitted to 
artificially inflating profits for almost seven years, and Takata Corp. said it supplied faulty air bags, 
leading to the recall of more than 40 million vehicles.“). 
  
558 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
which do not bode well for governance improvement.183  In the context of 
Toshiba, which had presumably accepted governance reform, the immense 
governance failures corroborates concerns that Japan is not meaningfully 
changing.184 
 
3. Recent Examples of Governance Failures and the Link to an Absence of 
Activism 
 
The problem of Japanese governance has been evident for some 
time.185  However, the Olympus accounting scandal provides an exemplar 
of managerial and director misconduct that would be almost 
incomprehensible in a jurisdiction with the potential for vigorous 
shareholder activism.186  The Olympus CEO, U.K. national Michael 
Woodford, was literally treated as an “enemy” and an “outcast” and fired 
for “disloyalty” in revealing a massive internal accounting fraud.187   
Woodford’s fall commenced after he had serious questions concerning 
the company’s accounting.  Woodford raised the possibility that accounting 
improprieties had taken place and was immediately branded a “disloyal 
 
 183. See Cooper, supra note 173 (noting “tolerance for employee wrongdoing, in contrast to the 
zero-tolerance policies at the world’s best-managed companies”). 
 184. See The Rot Inside Japan Inc., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/the-rot-inside-japan-inc-1441842664 (“Toshiba shows the need for a corporate-governance 
overhaul”). 
185.  Questions about nuclear safety arose in connection with Tokyo Electric. See Japanese 
Corporate Scandals: A Critical Mass of Disgust? ECONOMIST (Sept. 5, 2002, 11:41 AM), http://www. 
economist.com/node/1318056 (“The latest company to be caught deceiving the public is Tokyo Electric 
Power (TEPCO), Japan’s largest utility, which turns out to have filed at least 29 falsified reports to 
nuclear-safety regulators since the 1980s.”). 
The issue of company loyalty to managers causes companies to cover-up problems even if the 
outside shareholders will bear the brunt of future losses.  Id. (“In Japan, however, businessmen and 
bureaucrats often respond to such public worries by engaging in more secrecy rather than less. 
Occasionally, this leads to an even bigger scandal, and thus more hand-wringing.”). 
Indeed, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant crisis was the product of “the disturbing catalog of 
accidents that have occurred over the years and been belatedly reported to the public, if at all.  See also 
Scandal Ridden Energy Company behind Japan’s Nuke Crisis, CBS NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scandal-ridden-energy-company-behind-japans-nuke-crisis/; Fukushima 
report: Key points in nuclear disaster report, BBC NEWS (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news 
/world-asia-18718486 (“Collusion and lack of governance: the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant 
accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and [private plant operator] 
TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties.  They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be 
safe from nuclear accidents.  Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly ‘manmade’ . . .  We 
believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems . . . rather than issues 
relating to the competency of any specific individual.”). 
 186. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 13 (“In Japan, values such as loyalty, honor, and fidelity are 
also more important than shareholder profits.  But these values are applicable mainly to the relationship 
between the corporation and its senior managers, employees, allied companies, business partners, and 
other insider stakeholders; they do not apply to outsiders, non affiliated businesses, and owners.  The 
corporation’s owners are at the bottom of the pyramid.”). 
 187. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 13 
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traitor”188 and disrespected at the company.189  The “disloyalty” was not to 
the company and its owners but rather to the Olympus management, insider 
directors, and senior officers who had clearly benefited from the criminal 
activity and thus desired to cover up the accounting fraud. Shortly 
thereafter, a board meeting was convened and without any discussion of the 
accounting fraud and without any interest in hearing Woodford and 
discussing the fraud despite his presence, Woodford was summarily and 
unanimously fired.190  Incredibly, rather than create an internal uproar, the 
directors were unanimous in their disdain for Woodford and no dissenting 
director came to Woodford’s defense.  Subsequent to his firing, even the 
Japanese shareholders who logically would be upset that Woodford was 
fired were not complaining.  Woodford relates: 
 
Non-execs are there to hold the executive to account. They 
are there to look after the interests of the shareholders. 
Which brings me onto the shareholders.  The western 
shareholders, the American, European, Hong Kong, they 
are asking me to go back, but the Japanese shareholders 
have not said anything.  I mean the company has lost 80% 
of its value since I was dismissed three-and-a-half weeks 
ago.  It has now been put on the watch list by the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange.  It’s in a critical position.  But the 
Japanese shareholders haven’t said a word — one 
comment by Nippon Life two weeks ago saying we would 
like the full facts and clarity.  That’s tepid.  You know, it’s 
meaningless.191 
 
 
 188. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, supra note 153. (“But it’s a culture of deference and 
sycophants and yes men.  I mean in Japan people respect the position without questioning the person 
who takes and assumes that position.”). 
189.  See Karl Taro Greenfield, The Story Behind the Olympus Scandal, BLOOMBERG BUS.   
(Feb. 16, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-02-16/the-story-behind-the-oly 
mpus-scandal#p4 (“Woodford noticed that while the two Japanese men had sumptuous plates of sushi 
before them, he was served a tuna sandwich.”). 
 190. See id. (“The board met the next morning, Friday, October 14.  Kikukawa took to the podium 
and read a prepared statement.  ‘The board meeting scheduled to discuss concerns relating to the 
company’s M&A activity is cancelled. Instead, we have a new agenda.  The first is to discuss the 
motion to dismiss Mr. Woodford as president, representative director, and CEO.  Mr. Woodford cannot 
speak because he is an interested party.  All those in favor?’ (Board meetings at Olympus were 
simultaneously translated from Japanese to English and vice versa.)  All 12 board members present 
immediately raised their hands.”). 
191.  See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, supra note 153 (“Subsequently, Olympus “apologized” 
for the dismissal.”); see also OLYMPUS CORP., NOTICE CONCERNING PAST ACTIVITIES REGARDING 
DEFERRAL IN POSTING OF LOSSES (2011), available at http://www.olympus-global.com/en/common/ 
pdf/nr111108e.pdf. 
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The Olympus saga provides the archetype exemplar of loyalty among allied 
insider shareholders and employees at the expense of the disdained outside 
shareholders. 
The recent Toshiba scandal also corroborates the tale of poor 
governance plaguing Japan.192  Toshiba, once a leading Japanese company 
employing hundreds of thousands,193 admitted to a huge multi-year, billion 
dollar accounting scandal, after being caught.  The once mighty business 
entity has suffered huge financial losses, a plunging share price and debt 
cut to junk.194  Yet Toshiba managers and officers were more concerned 
about protecting insiders who planned/profited and or covered up the fraud 
than promoting the interests of the outside shareholder-owners.  As one 
governance expert notes, there seems to be “100% tolerance” for 
managerial cover-ups.   
 
Nicholas Benes, representative director of the Board 
Director Training Institute of Japan, was critical of Toshiba 
this month when the company said it had identified 30 
executives who had been involved in the accounting scandal 
— and none of them would lose their jobs.  He said the 
company was showing “100 percent tolerance” for employee 
wrongdoing in contrast to the zero-tolerance policies at the 
world’s best-managed companies.195 
 
While Toshiba has made some efforts at showing “remorse” and 
demonstrating “concern” the reality is more show than substance.196  The 
 
 192. Japan’s Toshiba conceded that it had engaged in a multi-billion dollar accounting fraud for 
almost a decade.  See Michal Addady, Toshiba’s Accounting Scandal Is Much Worse than We Thought, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/toshiba-accounting-scandal/ (“Toshiba 
admitted on Monday that it had overstated its profits by nearly $2 billion over the past 7 years, the Wall 
St. Journal reports . . . .  Evidently, Toshiba managers “set aggressive profit targets that subordinates 
could not meet without inflating divisional results were under pressure to report growing profits . . . . 
After the admission, Toshiba’s shares fell dramatically.”). 
 193. Annual Report, Operational Review 2012, TOSHIBA, http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/en/fin 
ance/ar/ar2012/tar2012eor.pdf. 
194.  See Akashi Mochizuki & Eric Pfanner, Toshiba, Facing $4.5 Billion Loss, Plans Deep Cuts, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/toshiba-expects-4-5-billion-loss-for-current-
fiscal-year-1450686830 (“Toshiba, racked by one of Japan’s biggest accounting scandals, also said it 
would eliminate nearly 8,000 jobs amid heavy restructuring costs at the conglomerate.  The accounting 
scandal has morphed into a wider crisis affecting nearly all of Toshiba’s significant units.  Shares in the 
company plunged 9.8% Monday and have lost more than half their value since March.”).  See Finbarr 
Flynn, Toshiba’s Credit Rating Lowered Two Levels to Junk by Moody’s, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2015, 
1:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/toshiba-s-credit-rating-lowered-two-
levels-to-junk-by-moody-s (“Toshiba Corp.’s long-term senior bond rating was cut two levels by 
Moody’s Investors Service to Ba2, it’s second-highest junk rating, from Baa3.  That was followed by a 
downgrade to sub-investment grade by Standard & Poor’s.”). 
 195. Cooper, supra note 173. 
 196. See Makiko Yamazaki, Toshiba Lawsuit Highlights Japan Governance Reform Still Lacking: 
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amount of money sought in recovery from former officers constitutes only 
a fraction of the actual loss in shareholder value.197  Moreover, “Toshiba 
has yet to fully explain why it is limiting its lawsuit to just five former 
executives, effectively absolving some current officials who were in senior 
roles during the years it was padding profits.”198   
Furthermore, and troubling, Toshiba had already implemented 
corporate governance reform.  The fact a multi-billion dollar fraud occurred 
post-reform speaks volumes.  “[T]hat the problem was continuing even 
though Toshiba had already implemented a US-style executive committee 
board system is an example of reform failure.  Clearly their outside 
directors did not function as expected.  And neither did the accounting firm 
that audited Toshiba.”199 
In a governance structure where a company CEO is summarily ousted 
for revealing internal fraud, and directors are more concerned about 
protecting their friends and allies rather than recovering company assets, 
activist investors attempting governance changes will also likely be met 
with robust resistance if not outright hostility.  Moreover, based upon the 
inter-locking ownership structure of the Keiretsu groups, acquiring a 
dominant or controlling percentage of shares is not merely daunting, it is 
impossible.  Therefore, engaging in activism in Japan is extremely difficult.  
Without activists monitoring and possibly removing directors, the directors 
and managers of a company have little incentive to avoid conflicts of 
interest and in fact have every incentive to manage the company for the 
advancement of their own private interests and the interests of their allied 
companies/shareholders. 
If insiders and managers can exploit a company’s assets, productivity 
and overall economic performance will decline.  An economy may thus be 
derailed by allowing management to continue to mismanage the corporate 
sector. This lack of incentive to improve shareholder performance and the 
disregard of outside shareholders in order to preserve or enhance the self-
interest of management makes activism an important available strategy to 
prevent insider exploitation.   
The Japanese governance architecture and corporate Japan’s emphasis 
on loyalty to insiders served Japan well until globalization and intensive 
 
Lawyers, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/12/us-toshiba-lawsuit-
idUSKCN0T10AA20151112 (“Toshiba Corp’s (6502.T) lawsuit against former executives linked to a 
$1.3 billion accounting scandal is a defensive manuever that highlights a lack of sincere reform, lawyers 
and corporate governance experts said.”). 
 197. See id. (“The 300 million yen ($2.44 million) in damages Toshiba is seeking pales in 
comparison with the over $7 billion decline in stock market value since the accounting problems came 
to light in early April.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Nakamura, supra note 147. 
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competition rendered many companies inefficient.  Japan, by keeping 
activists at bay, appears to be delaying the solution to what ails corporate 
Japan.  The lack of activism over the last twenty-five years may have 
delayed the governance turn-around so crucial to reforming corporate 
Japan.  While the lack of activism was certainly a boon to managers and 
inside directors, enabling them to retain their positions and reap the 
rewards, the absence of activism allowed managers and directors to 
continue to mismanage their companies causing severe damage to Japan.  
 
Whether Japan can successfully implement the vital governance 
reform is an open question. Corporate Japan has largely resisted 
implementing the spirit of reform.  
 
Independent, outside directors have been put in place, but 
they do not seem to function as they do in the US.  And, 
transparency and information disclosure have proven 
difficult to implement in many established Japanese firms.  
The continuing prevalence of Japan’s ‘dango’ practice 
(rigged bidding), for example, clearly violates the reforms’ 
transparency and information disclosure as well as fair 
competition objectives.200 
 
There is precedent for the unwillingness to embrace Western political 
and economic models.   
 
Since Japan opened up to the West in the early 19th century, 
there have been repeated attempts to import Western 
political and economic institutions, laws, technologies and 
even cultural practices.  But rather than being adopted in 
their original forms, Western practices have been selectively 
adapted to suit Japan’s needs, tastes and preferences with 
varied success.201   
  
Without meaningful changes in the governance of Japan Inc., any 
influx of foreign capital may be a short-term phenomenon.  In fact, 
“[f]oreign investors flocked to Japan earlier this year and then just as 
quickly exited in the past few months.”202 It should be noted that: 
 
 200. Nakamura, supra note 147. 
 201. Id. 
202.  Ren, supra note 151.  See also Anna Kitanaka et al., Black Rock Joins $46 Billion Japan 
Pullout, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-
10/abenomics-rebuked-as-blackrock-joins-46-billion-japan-pullout  (“Starting in the first days of 
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The problems that motivated the Japanese reforms are far 
from being solved.  Foreign firms will still need to beware of 
the implications of this in doing business in Japan.  
Corporate governance reforms to implement US-style 
practices are ongoing in other countries in East Asia, such as 
China and South Korea. Large pyramidal business groups in 
both countries (that is, state-owned enterprise groups and 
chaebols) present serious challenges to those reform efforts 
too.  Implanting institutions and practices from other 
countries rarely succeeds.  Japan’s experiences, both 
successes and failures, may prove helpful to Western 
business practitioners and policymakers interested in 
understanding business conditions in East Asia.203 
 
Japan provides an illustrious example of the perils inherent in a 
governance structure that gives little heed to shareholder value and 
simultaneously provides perhaps the archetype example of the benefits of 
shareholder activism.  
 
B. THE VIRTUES OF UNITED STATES ACTIVISM 
 
Not surprisingly, activism is vibrant in the United States, where the 
governance mantra is shareholder value.  This is in keeping with corporate 
law rulings emphasizing that a company must be managed to maximize the 
value to the company and its shareholders.204  Activists ideally target 
companies whose management is involved in various agency conflicts with 
shareholders.  These conflicts can be shirking, where the managers shirk 
their obligations in favor of pursuing their own self-interest, or looting, 
where the managers exploit the assets of the company for their personal 
advantage.205  Activism seeks to change the status quo and attempts to 
extract more value to shareholders.   
 
 
 
2016, foreign traders have been pulling out of Tokyo’s stock market for 13 straight weeks, the 
longest stretch since 1998.  Overseas investors dumped $46 billion of shares as economic reports 
deteriorated, stimulus from the Bank of Japan backfired and the yen’s surge pressured exporters.  
The benchmark Topix index is down 17 percent in 2016, the world’s steepest declines behind Italy.”) 
 203. Nakamura, supra note 147. 
 204. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director conduct impermissible and a violation of their 
fiduciary duties in not sharing the highest value for the shareholders). 
 205. See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative 
View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 105 (1998) (describing managerial agency conflicts that 
plague companies with a dispersed shareholder base as commonly found in the United States). 
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Taking advantage of regulatory changes and a public mood, 
oriented toward rooting out corporate misdeeds, a growing 
number of hedge fund managers have taken up Mr. Icahn’s 
tactics to wage populist battles against chief executives.  In 
letters, often colorfully worded, tacked on to filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, they are demanding 
that executives sell off units, pay dividends or take other 
actions to raise stock prices quickly.206 
 
Corporate law rulings have established unequivocally that in the 
United States, a company must be managed in the pursuit of the interests of 
the owners — the shareholders.  Failure to do so is a violation of the 
fiduciary duties of directors and managers.  Therefore, the United States 
markets and corporate law permit and reward activists who can bring 
enhanced value to shareholders. 
By allowing an environment conducive to activism, the United States 
enables activists to serve as backup monitors of management and directors. 
There are tangible benefits to shareholders.  Jurisdictions which discourage 
activism, greatly increase the risks of bad corporate governance.  By 
eliminating or lessening the options for activists, managerial slack can 
become entrenched.  Insulating directors and managers affords them the 
opportunity to exploit the business for their own self-interest.  The decision 
of whether to close divisions or to liquidate the company itself may be 
tinged with director and managerial conflicts of interest. 
The “market for corporate control” is vital in imbuing activists with 
the ability to transform an inefficiently run business to the benefit of the 
company and its shareholders.  In fact: 
 
The “market for corporate control” idea is that poor and 
inefficient management of a public company depresses its 
stock price.  And if the stock price is sufficiently low, a 
hostile outsider can buy a controlling block, even at a 
premium, and turn a profit by shifting control from the 
 
206.  Riva D. Atlas, Some Funds Taking Role Far Beyond Just Investor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/business/some-funds-taking-role-far-beyond-just-investor. 
html. 
Sometimes the activists seek board seats. See Katya Kazakina, Billionaire Loeb Confirmed as 
Sotheby’s New Board Member, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2014 9:02 AM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/2014-05-29/billionaire-loeb-confirmedas-sotheby-s-new-board-member.html.  
(“Billionaire hedge-fund manager Dan Loeb was confirmed as Sotheby’s (BID) newest director 
following a closely watched proxy fight between the auction house and its largest shareholder.  Loeb 
and five others were officially appointed to the board today at Sotheby’s annual shareholder meeting in 
New York.  The activist investor sat in the front row of the room.  His Third Point LLC owns 9.65 
percent of Sotheby’s shares, according to a regulatory filing.”). 
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incumbent board to a new board selected by the outsider.  
That new board will likely terminate the incumbent senior 
executives — clearly a poor outcome for them.  Executives 
are aware of this, and thus the market for corporate control 
incentivizes executives to work hard to keep the share price 
high and rising, so as not to end up a casualty of a hostile 
takeover.  The disciplining effect of the threat of hostile 
takeover is widely viewed as a powerful way to align the 
interests of management with those of shareholders, a core 
issue at the heart of the public corporation.207 
 
In contrast to Japan where a change in corporate control is difficult for 
activists to achieve,208 the take-over market is robustly encouraged in the 
United States by a shareholder-value centric governance model. 
Moreover, real economic benefits in the form of shareholder returns, 
managerial performance, and long-term operating income arise from 
activism.209  A recent analysis of activism on the operating performance of 
target companies had important conclusions: 
 
[Activist] intervention is associated with productivity gains 
at the plants of the targeted companies.  We also measure the 
performance of plants that were sold subsequent to 
intervention and find that they were among the worst 
performing plants at the time of divesture, but later 
experience a substantial improvement under new ownership 
relative to a matched sample.  We find that employees of 
target firms experience a reduction in work hours and 
stagnation in wages while their productivity improves.  
These results support the view that hedge fund activists 
facilitate improvements in productive efficiency by 
improving the productivity of assets-in-place and by capital 
re-allocation.  Overall, the evidence provided in the paper 
 
 
 207. See Schwartz, supra note 75, at 241. 
 208. Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But have the issues that motivated the reforms been solved in the 
decade since they were adopted?  Has the market for corporate control achieved competitive market 
principles, transparency and information disclosure?  And was the share value maximization principle 
fully adopted by Japanese managers?  The answer to these questions are mostly no.”). 
 209. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 
THE J. OF FIN. Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (Aug. 2008), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research 
/pubfiles/4128/Hedge%20fund%20activism%20Final.pdf (“To summarize, we find that hedge fund 
activism is associated with an almost immediate increase in payout, heightened CEO discipline, and an 
improvement in analyst sentiment.  On the other hand, the improvement in operating performance takes 
longer to manifest.”). 
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highlights the real and fundamental effects that hedge fund 
activists facilitate at target firms.210 
 
Improving the performance of companies will clearly have a positive 
effect on national economic performance including incentivizing more 
innovation.211  Another benefit of activism is a counterbalance to the rising 
influence of “lazy investors” such as passive index funds and ETFs that do 
not involve themselves in company performance as their function is to 
track the shares or the overall index.  Doing so gives a “free ride” to 
directors and managers and governance will suffer.  As a result: 
 
[A]ctivists fill a governance void that afflicts today’s public 
companies.  A rising chunk of the stock market sits in the 
hands of lazy investors.  Index funds and exchange-traded 
funds mimic the market’s movements, and typically take 
little interest in how firms are run; conventional mutual 
funds and pension funds that oversee diversified portfolios 
dislike becoming deeply involved in firms’ management.  In 
the face of Wall Street’s provocateurs, America’s lazy 
money is waking up.  Whether their ideas are barmy or 
brilliant, the activists make it harder for investors to stay on 
the sidelines.  Mutual funds and pension funds are being 
forced to take a view, and hence become more active and 
forward-looking.  European and Asian shareholders say they 
do not need activists because they have more power than 
American investors over managers’ pay and appointments.  
They typically dismiss Mr. Icahn and his friends as an 
American solution to an American problem.  And, for 
cultural reasons, the few European activists tend to be more 
diplomatic and consultative than their brash cousins.  Yet 
wherever there are stock markets you will find 
underperforming companies, clubbable bosses and lazy 
capital.  The public company was never meant to be a 
bureaucracy run by distant managers accountable to funds  
 
 
 
 210. Alon Brav et al.,  The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and 
Labor Outcomes, THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. (2015), rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/26/ 
rfs.hhv037 
 211. Julian Atanassov, Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover 
Legislation and Corporate Patenting, THE J. OF FIN., Vol. 68, pp 1097–1131 (2013) (finding a negative 
correlation between jurisdictions that enact anti-takeover laws with patents). 
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run by computers.  The activist revolt will help give it a new 
lease of life.212 
 
The superior economy enjoyed by the United States demonstrates the 
virtues of activism.  While United States economic performance is not 
without soft patches, as compared to both continental Europe and Japan, 
the United States has significantly better national economic performance.213  
Indeed, the need to foster activism globally is demonstrated by at least one 
study bolstering the case for encouraging activism across borders.  A study 
of nearly 1800 activist “attacks” in almost two dozen nations on target 
companies from 2000-2010 had several interesting conclusions.214  These 
activist moves ranged the gamut from takeover attempts to engagement 
over executive compensation to dividend policy.215  The study concluded 
that certain types of activism, such as takeovers and restructuring, created 
shareholder value.216  The analysis also concluded that other, non-activist 
types of conduct, failed to increase shareholder value,217 while “[a]ctivist 
engagements that are successful in achieving a corporate restructuring, 
particularly a takeover, or multiple objectives, generate significant value 
for shareholders.”218 
Although, as in anything, potential for abuse exists,219 it would be 
counter-intuitive to believe that activists do not substantially benefit 
portfolio companies.220   Directors and managers are charged with the duty 
to monitor companies on behalf of shareholders and to obtain the best value 
 
 212. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18.   
 213. See Eduardo Porter, Economic Health? It’s Relative, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/us-economy-is-doing-well-compared-with-other-nations 
.html?_r=0 (”A more illuminating question is how we have done relative to other countries that were 
caught in the global financial cataclysm.  By that standard, economic growth in the United States has 
done surprisingly well.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Zeke Faux, Icahn Says BlackRock’s Finks Makes Fixing Bad Businesses Harder, BLOOMBERG 
(May 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-03/icahn-says-blackrock-s-fink-
makes-fixing-bad-businesses-harder (“Some of the other investors who call themselves activists are 
really out to “pump and dump” stocks, Icahn said.  They announce their intentions to pressure 
management, he said, then get out as soon as the share price rises.”). 
 220. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“The Economist has analysed the 50 largest 
activist positions in America since 2009. More often than not, profits, capital investment and R&D have 
risen.”); Becht et al., supra note 128  (“Our analysis however provides evidence that increases in 
shareholder value of firms targeted by activists are not simply short-term.  Increases in shareholder 
value due to activism are also tightly linked to activists achieving their goals.  In Europe and North 
America, where activists are more successful in achieving outcomes, gains for shareholders are larger 
than in Asia, where activists have seen limited success.”).  
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for shareholders,221 yet frequently fail to do so.222  Activism can keep a 
check on badly run companies and activists’ efforts enable smaller 
shareholders to be rescued from manipulative or corrosive management.  In 
a very real sense, activists can be said to replace directors when directors 
fail to act.223 
U.S.-style activism is good; it works.  Accordingly, calls for curtailing 
or eliminating shareholder activism should be rejected.  While 
modifications in disclosure regulations may be justified given technological 
advancement and financial product innovation, activism is virtuous and 
should be encouraged.224 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The United States business landscape and the governance architecture 
is being profoundly influenced by activist funds.225  “Activist investors . . . 
are a burgeoning breed.  They’re revamping governance and executive-pay 
practices at companies big and small by doing more than winning or 
merely threatening proxy fights.”226 
Activism and has engendered a vigorous debate in the United States 
and beyond.  Proponents and opponents have legitimate arguments.  On 
one hand, these activists may be overly focused on immediate profit and 
may employ stealth techniques to acquire shares.  Yet, activists also 
 
221.  See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (corroborating that shareholder value is the primary driver of U.S. 
corporate governance).  See also David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 181 (2014) (maximization of shareholder value is centric to United States corporate law); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO L.J. 439, 439 (2000-
2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally 
strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors 
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1465, 51035 (2007) (detailing the judicial opinions holding that “shareholder value . . . as the ultimate 
corporate objective”).  
 222. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Yet wherever there are stock markets you will 
find underperforming companies, clubbable bosses and lazy capital.  The public company was never 
meant to be a bureaucracy run by distant managers accountable to funds run by computers.  The activist 
revolt will help give it a new lease of life.”). 
 223. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM . L. REV. 863 (2013) (noting the roles 
of activists in corporate governance).  
 224. See Groden, supra note 26 (noting some opponents claim that activists’ use of derivatives may 
straddle the line of legality).  This raises a legitimate question but rather than ban or discourage 
activism, an updated disclosure requirement is a preferred approach.  Slawotsky, supra note 25 
(discussing whether 13(d) should be amended in light of transformations in financial markets).   
 225. See, e.g., Alan M. Klein, Shareholder Activism in M&A Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (2014), https://corpgov .law.harvard.edu/2014/02/26/shareholder-
activism-in-ma-transactions/ (noting the importance of activism in corporate mergers and acquisitions).  
 226. Joann S. Lublin, In for the Long Haul: More Activist Investors Are Winning Board Seats and 
Helping Companies Revamp Their Governance Practices, THE J. REP.: CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 17, 
2005), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/NewHomePage/articles/activis tinvesting.htm. 
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provide a strong incentive for directors to oversee their companies and for 
managers to embrace shareholder value.  In commenting on BlackRock 
Fink’s anti-activist letter, Carl Icahn noted that “Fink is protecting 
underperforming executives with his campaign against activist 
investors,”227 stating that ‘“[y]ou can’t get rid of these guys,’ . . . .  A lot of 
them feel like they can do what they want, because of guys like Larry Fink.  
I can’t remember one time that they [BlackRock] voted for us.”228 
The almost insurmountable challenges to activists operating in Japan 
may be a strong factor contributing to Japan’s lost decades. Japanese 
economic performance has been lackluster for over two decades.  The 
difficulty to engage in activism in Japan has prevented inefficiently run 
companies from being transformed into productive businesses and has 
prolonged Japan’s economic malaise.  Japan provides a sterling exemplar 
of why activism should not be banned or curtailed.  In contrast, the ability 
of activists to engage in activism in United States markets may be a tonic 
preventing the managers from continuing to be inefficient and/or exploit 
the company. 
Therefore, activism does have a role to play in corporate America, 
especially when activists employ their influence to ensure lackluster 
managers take actions such as amending the governance structure, adding 
directors, restructuring the capital base or selling a division or the company 
outright.  Without the risk to their positions, managers and directors and, 
where applicable, other insider interests, can be expected to engage in 
various conduct conducive to their own financial self-interest.  Activists 
can and do prevent or stop such practices within a company.  While 
detractors of United States activism claim that activism focuses on short-
term profits at the expense of other stakeholders, does a stakeholder system 
or a model of governance that does not ascribe overwhelming importance 
to shareholder value really deliver superior results?  No.  Accordingly, 
legitimate activism as a virtuous component of corporate governance needs 
to be encouraged and incentivized rather than banned or limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 227. Lublin, supra note 226.  
 228. Id.   
